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Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as
Metropolitan Equity
DAVID D. TROUTT†
We’re not talking about the Normandy School District losing their 
accreditation because of their buildings, or their structures, or their
teachers. We are talking about violent behavior that is coming in
with my first grader, my third grader, and my middle schooler that
I’m very worried about. . . . I want the same security that
Normandy gets when they walk though their school doors. And I 
want it here. And I want that security before my children walk into
Francis Howell, because I shopped for a school district. I deserve to
not have to worry about my children getting stabbed, or taking a 
drug, or getting robbed because that’s the issue.1 
Another liberal social engineering program doomed to fail, just like
public housing in the 1960s and busing in the 1970s. While you can
force people to work together, you simply cannot force people to live
together who don’t want to as they will simply pick up and move as
people whom they don’t want to live next to move in. Even the
wealthy white liberals in Bill and Hillary’s town are aghast at poor
residents moving in. This simply won’t work.2 
† Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School; Director, Rutgers Center on Law,
Inequality and Metropolitan Equity. I want to thank the many Fordham Law
School faculty for their helpful comments on an early draft presented at the
Fordham Legal Theory Workshop, especially Tanya Hernandez and Nestor
Davidson. I am also indebted to the colleagues who commented on a draft
presented at the Fourth Annual Local Government Law Scholarship Conference.
Elise Boddie and Ventura Simmons provided invaluable insights. I am grateful
for the timely and rigorous research assistance from Handel Destinvil, Emily
Stein, and Valerie Shore. As always, no work is ever done without the love and
support of my family. All mistakes are mine.
1. The Problem We All Live With, THIS AMERICAN LIFE (July 31, 2015),
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/562/transcript (quoting
Beth Cirami, a parent of a child attending Francis Howell School District,
Missouri).
2. Comment by Paul from Kansas to The End of Federally Financed Ghettos, 
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6 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
INTRODUCTION
In 1968, Congress declared that “[i]t is the policy of the
United States to provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States.”3 It is the
purpose of this Article to demonstrate the scope of what that
policy covers today. Since World War II, housing policy has
been fundamentally concerned with economic opportunity.
In the twenty-first century, I argue, fair housing law is
fundamentally about reducing economic inequality. I reach
this outcome through an analysis of the dual and sometimes
overlapping objectives of the Federal Fair Housing Act4 
itself—anti-discrimination and anti-segregation—and the
empirically demonstrable nature of place-based inequality
that has given rise to multidisciplinary efforts to achieve
“metropolitan equity.”
Sometimes a single conflict captures the complexity of
problems that a legal framework was designed to redress. In 
this example, two school districts in a southern state are
separated by thirty miles, racially homogenous student 
populations, and most measures of academic achievement.
State law has temporarily allowed black students from the 
low-performing district to attend school in the mostly white,
high-achieving district, and white parents show up at a
school board meeting to vent their collective frustration.
Though race is never mentioned, the parents’ rage runs
through concerns couched in school safety, resource
diversion, and the foreign norms of outsider children. One by
one, they deliver into microphones the threats of racial
exodus promised by Charles Tiebout.5 The issue is as much 
segregation as education. The year is not 1970, but 2015. The
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/opinion/the-end-
of-federally-financed-ghettos.html.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2012).
5. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 419–22 (1956).
   
 
     
     
   




       
       
     
     
     
      
   
   
   
  
     
   
 
           
      
      
   
      
    
            
       
 
           
       
     
   
           
         
         
      
          
     
72017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
gymnasium just happens to be in the South (Missouri) in the 
same county (St. Louis) that became notorious for the
shooting death of a black teenager by a white police officer
within the same year. That tragic event in Ferguson, and
many more around the country that year, demonstrate that
these local, yet national, problems have institutional
repercussions that flow from policing to housing to schools to 
municipal finance and back again.
As the analysis in this Article will show, all of this was
contemplated by Title VIII, the last of the major civil rights
acts. “Fair housing” is a far more comprehensive term than
commonly understood. It has always referenced the goal of
racially integrated suburbs as a cure for urban ghettoization,
and it has always recognized a regional perspective. At the
core of fair housing are two broad ideas: anti-discrimination
and anti-segregation.6 The line between them is not bright,
and the two were expected to overlap depending on the 
context, though they sometimes conflict.7 Both prongs are 
evident in the legislative history, statutory text, and early
judicial opinions. Toward the last part of the twentieth
6. I favor the term “anti-segregation” for most references in this Article
rather than “desegregation” or “integration.” Desegregation implies a process for
undoing a state of segregation, which applies to some, but not all, of the
references discussed here. Integration suggests a step beyond desegregation,
according to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the attainment of something socially
more interconnected than the numerical decline of segregated conditions. Anti-
segregation, on the other hand, is used here to indicate a statutory purpose in
opposition to the legacy and policies maintaining segregated conditions in
particular places.
7. See ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 7.3 (2013). Congress did not consider the conflict because it “believed that
integration and nondiscrimination were complementary goals.” Id. (citations
omitted); Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal
Services Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 718 (2008) (“The goal
of the FHA was not merely to end housing discrimination based on race and
national origin, but to replace the ghettos by truly integrated and balanced living
patterns.”) (citations omitted); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact
Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact
Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 360 (2013).
   
  
    
      
   
     
       
   
  
 
   
   
    
  
      
    
   
    
   
     
    
        
     
    
 
    
 
               
     
        
         
      
  
          
       
 
         
 
8 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
century, the anti-discrimination prong became dominant.8 
Since the turn of the century, the anti-segregation prong has
seen a mild renaissance,9 including the recent issuance by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development of a
final rule on the meaning of the Act’s requirement to
“affirmatively further fair housing” (AFFH).10 Taken as a
unified whole, the Act’s two prongs advance an interest in 
fair housing that encompasses virtually any institutional
means that connects people’s residential status to social and
economic mobility.
This is why it should not surprise us to see that, lurking
behind the educational integration issue confronting two
school districts in the example above, is a more fundamental
problem of residential segregation. Education is viewed by
all the parents in the Missouri situation as an institutional
mechanism for mobility, a means to better life prospects. For
the parents in the high-opportunity district, classroom 
integration poses the first threat to the stability of that
mechanism. By 2015, many comfortably use the language of
consumption to remind school board members that they have
purchased that stability through home ownership, and they
will sell off their stake unless it is properly—in their view— 
stewarded. Unspoken are the numerous benefits that 
residents of the Francis Howell district enjoy in securing the
foundations of their children’s economic opportunities by
excluding the much poorer black children from the 
Normandy district—safe streets to play and compete in, high
8. This may have been a flaw in the law’s original design. See John A.
Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act at
40, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING COMMUNITY DEV. L. 145, 152 (2008) (“The focus on
antidiscrimination normative measures has served to increase the freedom of
choice for homebuyers, but it has not necessarily helped produce integrated
neighborhoods or addressed segregated living patterns.”).
9. See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d
398, 408 (D. Md. 2005) (finding defendants failed to adequately consider regional
approaches to segregated public housing in the city).
10. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16,
2015) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903).
   
   
     
      
    
  
     
 
    
     
   
     
 
  
   
      
     
   
    
 
     
       
 
 
    
     
  
    
    
  
     
    
 
   
      
 
       
 
92017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
median incomes to attract economic development and job
growth, healthy food options, strong libraries, and the rest. 
What begins in this example with a demand for economically
and racially homogenous schools easily corresponds to other
aspects of residential membership. It supports the belief 
among many that “housing policy is school policy”—at least
from a structural vantage point.
This understanding of the federal fair housing concept is
especially important now that courts as well as local
policymakers must interpret a variety of initiatives
associated with either mobility-based fair housing litigation,
such as the Supreme Court’s recent decision affirming
disparate impact analysis in housing choice voucher (HCV) 
programs,11 the application of HUD’s new AFFH regulations,
or the continued experimentation with subsidized housing
remedies that are either mixed income or based on dispersal.
I argue here that the scope and reach of these initiatives can
be significantly greater than we have previously allowed.
While the precise scope of Title VIII is impossible to specify,
it should be measured by the principle of fairness, or equity, 
and by the interest in integration for the clear civil rights
purpose of equality of opportunity. The equity-integration-
opportunity trio of substantive norms underlies the entire 
design of the legislative and constitutional idea. Fairness is
a little-explored feature of fair housing, so I spend time 
developing that principle later. Integration is also under-
imagined. While it clearly means racially diverse residential
communities, it speaks to something more basic—resources. 
The imperative of racial integration has always been
understood to acknowledge not only the moral goal of
inclusive relationships but also the practical consequences of
shared resources. There are many ways to share resources 
more equitably. Thus, integration under the FHA could
include a demand for regionally integrated resources. What
11. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2015).
   
 
     
     
   
 
 
       
  
   
   
   
    
     
    
  
      
     
  
    
     
    
    
  
   
  
   
   
 
     
 
         
      
       
           
     
     
 
10 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
directs the design of policies that promote resource sharing 
is the objective of greater economic and social opportunity
through compromises deemed equitable. In this way, the
three elements of equity, integration, and opportunity
reinforce each other. The fullness of this regenerative fair
housing architecture has not yet been realized.12 
For this we have paid the price alluded to in the second
quote above. The writer’s exasperated reaction to a New York 
Times editorial supporting HUD’s AFFH rule expresses a
negative, but mostly neutral, view on residential
segregation. Fifty years after passage of the Act, Paul is tired
of what he seems to consider unworkable big government
schemes to “engineer” what he believes are socially based
living arrangements among unwilling partners. Paul is
representative of hundreds of public commenters whenever
issues of residential segregation or affordable housing make
the news (though his language is milder than most). The
more pressing issue is not one’s closeness to social
relationships across race, but rather one’s proximity to
material opportunity and its institutional ingredients. That
is what is being contested in the Missouri gym by white
parents who probably sympathize with Paul. Their perennial
resistance to the Fair Housing Act, its weak terms and
weaker enforcement is, ironically, why segregation remains
such a pervasive feature of American residential
organization—not our exhaustion over trying to make it
work. Yet this is precisely the condition fair housing was
supposed to transform.
The persistence of inequality fueled by segregation has
12. In anticipation of the passage of HUD’s latest assessment tool for
disbursements of HUD funding, ProPublica revisited its 2012 story, which
documented HUD’s history of non-enforcement. The story found that HUD had
only withheld funding for violations of the Fair Housing Act on two occasions
since the early 1970s. Nikole Hannah-Jones, Living Apart: How the Government
Betrayed a Landmark Civil Rights Law, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 29 2012, updated July
8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/living-apart-how-the-government-
betrayed-a-landmark-civil-rights-law.
   
     
     
    
   
    
  
       
    
    
     
     
      
    
    
 
    
     
  
 
   
     
 
          
        
          
        
           
  
  
             
    
  
 
      
     
        
    
         
  
112017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
led to the emergence of regional or “metropolitan equity” as
a remedial framework for advocates of greater opportunity.13 
Metropolitan equity is the idea that all parts of a region are 
relevant to the distribution of opportunity in any part, and
that remedies for expanding mobility can and should be 
assessed on an equitable basis. The concept derives not only
from housing and civil rights law, but other disciplines such
as economics, urban planning, sociology and political
science.14 Increasingly appealing to lawyers, metropolitan
equity examines the structures that reproduce racial and
economic inequality and finds them rooted in place. It seeks
a more equitable distribution of tax base revenues, housing
vouchers, and infrastructure dollars across metropolitan
areas, altering a stratified landscape of winner and loser
municipalities.15 
Fair housing and metropolitan equity share much in 
common, but they are not the same thing. They rest on
different premises—the one on the presence of 
discrimination, the other with at least its legacy effects. This 
Article bridges them in an effort to show the greater scope to 
which Title VIII is susceptible. To do so, I posit that they are
each related species of a common theory of structural
13. See Brief for Housing Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
at 40, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 
2507 (2015) (“HUD has only recently proposed a rule that would condition grants
on policies to affirmatively further fair housing, but that such a rule is now being
considered nearly 47 years after the Fair Housing Act required it, is itself
suggestive of how racial segregation has been permitted to rigidify.”); see also
Deborah Nelson & Himanshu Ojha, Redistributing Up, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 18, 
2012), www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/12/redistributing-up/266400/
(“Inequality has increased in 49 of 50 states since 1989.”); Rakesh Kochar et al.,
Wealth Gaps Rise to Record Highs Between Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (July 26, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/07/26/ 
wealth-gaps-rise-to-record-highs-between-whites-blacks-hispanics/.
14. See generally NEIGHBORHOOD AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN
MODERN AMERICA (Harriet B. Newburger, Eugene L. Birch & Susan Wachter,
eds., 2011); WILLIAM H. HUDNUT, HALFWAY TO EVERYWHERE: A PORTRAIT OF
AMERICA’S FIRST TIER SUBURBS (2004).
15. See MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN
REALITY 28–48 (2002).
   
  
       
      
   
     
   
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
     
  
  
    
     
     
   
   




    
    
    
     
 
        
        
       
         
        
     
  
12 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
inequality. Because this theoretical foundation has not been
articulated before, I offer a theory of structural inequality
under law. Structural inequality theory entails comparative
analyses of the institutional rules governing those place-
based public and private institutions most responsible for
promoting or retarding equal opportunity. The theory
contains the following additional observations: The
geography of regional opportunity is predictable and follows
patterns of racial and economic segregation that are easily
demonstrated. The primary feature of empirical analyses of 
inequality is concentration—of wealth and well-resourced
institutions on the one hand, and poverty and under-
resourced institutions on the other. These spatial
concentrations (often by jurisdiction) show how place has
become the repository of inequitable institutional
arrangements—racist and otherwise—that contribute to
gross disparities in material outcomes for particular groups.
Hence, structural inequality requires the study of formal and
informal institutional rules. Which institutions? An
incomplete list includes education, health care, housing 
policies, banking and real estate practices, infrastructure
priorities, transportation, law enforcement and criminal
justice. One’s opportunities for greater mobility are generally
no better than the resources available to the institutions
with which one interacts.
The Missouri example above reveals that what gained
national notoriety as a police shooting in the inner-ring 
suburb of Ferguson, reflected decades of segregation and
institutional inequity across much of St. Louis County’s 
ninety-one municipalities.16 Studies whose focus, tools, and
16. A brief demographic comparison of the two districts is instructive. The
Francis Howell School District (FHSD) serves St. Charles County, a western
neighbor of St. Louis County where the Normandy District is located. According
to the 2010 Census, the FHSD district is overwhelmingly white (90.9%), with
mostly homeowners (85.5%) and very few renters (14.5%). Census 2010 Profile
Report, Francis Howell School District, MO. CENSUS DATA CTR. (2016),
http://census.missouri.edu/census2010/report.php?g=97000US2928950. By
   
    
   
     
     
    
      
    
   
  
   
   
   
    
     
    
  
      
 
     
       
       
      
   
       
       
      
 
          
     
          
     
         
     
 
      
 
             
    
 
132017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
normative commitments fall within the rubric of
metropolitan equity have shown the historical interaction of
several institutions to perpetuate racial and economic
inequality across that region since at least the start of the
Jim Crow era.17 More recently, the Department of Justice
looked only at the city of Ferguson, yet corroborated many of
those findings with respect to coordinated discrimination by
the municipal court system, the city council, code 
enforcement officials, public finance and law enforcement.18 
The problem I consider for the first time in this Article is
whether the convergence of fair housing with metropolitan
equity should justify an expansion of Title VIII’s scope 
beyond simply housing and urban development.
Metropolitan equity is both a descriptive and a remedial
framework, but it is not a legal framework, per se. Fair
housing is a more comprehensive legal framework than 
perhaps thought, encompassing the twin goals of reducing
contrast, the Normandy district—renamed the Normandy Schools Collaborative
since its de-accreditation and re-accreditation—is 97% black, with small
percentages of whites and Hispanics, and the vast majority of students are
eligible for free and reduced price lunch. Normany Sch. Dist., WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normandy_School_District. According to the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, the Normandy high school had the second highest rate of
discipline in the state in 2014. Elisa Crouch, Normandy High: The Most




17. See, e.g., COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE OF
THE AMERICAN CITY (2008) (accompanying interactive maps showing the
historical patterns of law, policy, and local practice to secure advantages for white
communities over blacks are available at http://mappingdecline.lib.uiowa.edu/ 
map/); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON:
PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), http://www.clime. newark.
rutgers.edu/sites/CLiME/files/EPI%20making-of-ferguson.pdf (analyzing the
particular politics and policies that coalesced in reaction to demographic changes
across St. Louis County).
18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_ 
report.pdf.
   
  
   
   
  
      
      
   
    
  
 
     
    
  
  
       
    
   
  
      
  
  
     
     
   
     
 
   
    
  
     
    
    
   
 
 
        
      
   
14 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
discrimination in housing and reducing segregation in
relationships that go beyond housing alone. Left unresolved,
however, is the precise basis for extending Title VIII to other
institutional barriers to opportunity, such as infrastructure
spending, school choice, or criminal justice. The recent AFFH
rule, already a part of the original Act, clearly encompasses
the descriptive analysis of metropolitan equity theory.
Missing so far is the enforcement authority that would
complement its remedial thrust and make it more than 
aspirational.
I argue that the Fair Housing Act can and should be read
to include a much greater scope of cognizable issues than 
housing, because the anti-ghettoization/integration interests
that were earlier understood to be at the heart of the Act’s 
passage have had important, though limited, success across
a changed landscape.19 In Part II, I re-canvass the Fair
Housing Act’s historical antecedents, legislative history, and
early case law in order to demonstrate how its two prongs 
clearly contemplated a broader scope by half. The Kerner
Commission Report on Urban Disorders and Congress’s 
response to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King
were not simply a call to end discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing. They were part of a weakly enforced
legislative expectation of racially integrated suburbs that
rarely ever materialized. I then define and analyze a
spectrum of fair housing case law to determine the elements
of more “systemic” litigation efforts to overcome segregation.
Part II concludes with an analysis of how the encouragement
of the Inclusive Communities Project (ICP) disparate impact 
decision and HUD’s AFFH rule only suggests but does not 
demonstrate a broader scope for the Act. The problem
reflects changes in the way racism is conceived now and
whether sedimented privileges can be made constitutionally
actionable.
19. According to an assessment using slightly different variables, roughly
forty percent of such cases have succeeded between 1968 and 2013. See
Seicshnaydre, supra note 7, at 363.
   
   
    
   
    
 
  
   
     
   
  
   
   
   
   
     




    
     
  
     
  
    
   
   
     
   
 
          
           
152017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
That problem requires theoretical attention. In Part III,
I re-frame it by articulating a theory of place-based
inequality whose spatial analysis of disparate institutional
functioning supports both metropolitan equity and fair
housing remedies. Relying on examples of empirical research 
(some original) and other sources, I show the convergence 
between metropolitan equity’s interdisciplinary approach to
opportunity and the Fair Housing Act’s unrealized goals. In
Part IV, I analyze this convergence to argue for the Act’s 
extension into areas distinct from, but related to, housing,
such as transportation, tax-base sharing, and inter-district
educational choice policies. I conclude with the hope that this
analysis will encourage governmental entities to view their
obligations to fair housing more seriously, embolden fair
housing advocates to test the equitable potential of the Act,
and offer principles that will aid courts and policymakers in
resolving future conflicts.
I. FAIR HOUSING’S TWO IDEAS IN HISTORICAL AND LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
A.   Complementary Purposes, Necessary Divergence 
The twin ideas were born in the violent tumult of
persistent discrimination in housing opportunity, thick 
patterns of resource segregation, and deepening racial
isolation. Congress was not particularly trained in reading
riots, but the accompanying demands that were articulated
by leadership in cities that saw unrest were comprised of a
narrative that consistently sought both anti-discrimination 
and integration with the economic opportunities available
beyond the walls of the “ghetto.” Underlying the legislative
response was an assumption that eliminating discrimination
in housing choice would lead to integrated communities,
because discrimination caused segregation.20 However, case
20. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d
Cir. 1988) (“Congress saw the antidiscrimination policy as the means to effect the
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16 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
law reveals a more ambiguous causal pathway—even
conflict—between the two ideals21 against a history that, as
Justice Kennedy recounts in the recent ICP opinion,22 is as
relevant today as it is familiar.
One problem with our collective grasp of the civil rights
struggles of the 1960s, filtered as they are through the grain
of black and white photographs and the imaginations of
Hollywood writers, is that we tend to frame from the South. 
Sit-ins, Selma, and Freedom Rides resulted in legal and
cultural changes that are still felt today. By 1967, however,
the year before passage of the last Civil Rights Act, the story
had moved North. What became a default destination of the
Great Migration,23 the “ghetto” was a northern city
phenomenon, where the cumulative marginalizing effects of
redlining, urban renewal, and public housing had become the
singular experience of African American life and struggle.24 
antisegregation-integration policy.”).
21. Id. at 1105 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This statute was intended to bar
perpetuation of segregation. To apply it to bar maintenance of integration is
precisely contrary to the congressional policy ‘to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.’”) (citation omitted).
22. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project, Inc.,
125 S. Ct. 2507, 2515 (2015) (“De jure residential segregation by race was
declared unconstitutional almost a century ago, . . . but its vestiges remain today,
intertwined with the country’s economic and social life.”).
23. See generally Craig Heinicke, African-American Migration and Urban
Labor Skills: 1950 and 1960, 68 AGRIC. HIST. 185 (1994).
24. As the poet and playwright LeRoi Jones (later Amiri Baraka) wrote in
Home, the exodus of whites from the city meant that the city had become by the
early 1960s an inheritance distorted by racism. After naming several cities, Jones
writes: 
In these places life and its possibility, has been distorted almost
identically. And the distortion is as old as its sources: the fear,
frustration and hatred that Negroes have always been heir to in
America. It is just that in the cities, which were once the black man’s
twentieth century “Jordan,” promise is a dying bitch with rotting eyes.
LEROI JONES (AMIRI BARAKA), cold, hurt, and sorrow (streets of despair), in HOME:
   
     
   
    
     
      
 
   
    
      
     
     
   
    
    
    
     
  
     
    
   
    
    
 
 
   
          
       
        
       
 
      
      
    
      
      
      
 
   
     
172017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
All of its manifestations—from segregated schools to drugs,
crime and welfare dependency—were contained in the
confines of housing. Yet even before the post-war housing
programs and War on Poverty, the idea of blackness had
become synchronous with traits antithetical to “the good life”
in the view of Americans who saw themselves as white. This 
was especially true of crime and violence. As the historian 
Khalil Gibran Muhammad describes, twentieth century
urbanization witnessed a battle over the meaning of
criminality that was waged by intellectuals and politicians
alike, using crime statistics and divergent views of nature, to
distinguish crimes by European immigrants from crimes by
African Americans.25 What emerged was the criminalization
of blackness, a pathology of behaviors played out on the
streets of Northern cities. Muhammad writes, “[f]or white
Americans of every ideological stripe—from radical southern
racists to northern progressives—African American
criminality became one of the most widely accepted bases for
justifying prejudicial thinking, discriminatory treatment,
and/or acceptance of racial violence as an instrument of
public safety.”26 These views would accumulate in attitudes
about residential space and become calcified and codified in 
their most explicit structure, segregation. By the middle of 
SOCIAL ESSAYS, 115, 115 (Akashic Books 2009) (1966).
25. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF
BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010).
Muhammad reminds us of the constructions of race and worthiness for the
American Dream on both sides of a century-long racial divide that would inform
ideas about residential choice. 
The harvest of white ethnic succession—economic mobility, suburban
home ownership, union membership, and whites-only schools,
playgrounds and recreation centers—sown in the seeds of Progressive
era reforms and crime prevention fueled a growing antiliberal sentiment
that northern blacks were still their own worst enemies because
immigrants by dint of hard work escaped slums in spite of poverty,
nativism, and police misconduct.
Id. at 13.
26. Id. at 4.
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the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement would force this 
linchpin of inequality to a Congressional vote.
In January 1966, Dr. Martin Luther King launched the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s (SCLC) “first 
sustained Northern movement” in Chicago, demanding an
end to discrimination in jobs, housing, and schools.27 He 
faced resistance to his nonviolent message by more militant
urban blacks and white backlash so violent in Northern 
suburbs that he abandoned his march on a Chicago suburb,
Cicero, Illinois. “I have never in my life seen such hate,” King
said after being beaten during a march through a white
neighborhood. “Not in Mississippi or Alabama. This is a
terrible thing.”28 Indeed, nearly half of African Americans
lived in Northern cities by that time, many in a public
housing project. These were the neighborhoods that revolted
in riots after King was assassinated in 1968, leading to
passage of the Fair Housing Act. That visceral history of the
Northern ghetto finally motivated Congress to act. Unlike
other civil rights landmarks, however, the tepidness of the 
original federal fair housing architecture has ensured that
the idea of a ghetto—a racially isolated repository of 
structural inequality—is not as archaic as the name
suggests.
Fair housing was a response to an already sedimented
place-based inequality, expressed through a desperate 
combination of chaotic uprisings, nonviolent protests, and
backdoor prodding. At the time of the civil disorders, the 
social and institutional geography of the country reflected a
clear binary between blacks in inner-city neighborhoods and
whites in suburbs. The counterweight to this residential
segregation by race is often confused for simple residential
integration by race. Then, as now, this is too facile. Blacks
were not so much segregated from white people as they were
27. TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965– 
68, at 500–22 (2006).
28. Id. at 511.
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excluded from the opportunities connected to the institutions
where whites lived. As Malcolm X said in his autobiography,
inclusion among the institutions that conferred better life 
prospects was a “human rights” objective for black people:
Respect as human beings! That’s what America’s black masses
want. That’s the true problem. The black masses want not to be
shrunk from as though they are plague-ridden. They want not be
walled up in slums, in the ghettoes, like animals. They want to live
in an open, free society where they can walk with their heads up,
like men, and women!29 
Because the resources supporting social mobility
followed the residential choices of whites, open housing 
choice demanded the right to reside where those resources 
were. Because systemic forms of discrimination prevented
blacks from living within the boundaries of those resources, 
fair housing demanded the right to be free from
discrimination. Thus, even in the midst of urban riots and
accelerating white flight to the suburbs, the synthesis of
anti-discrimination and anti-segregation determined the fair
housing idea. The SCLC push for “jobs, housing and
education” combined all the institutional connections that 
were denied from African American mobility as a result of 
discrimination.30 Courts would soon use the language of
avoiding further “ghettoization.”
This synthesis had several antecedents.
Nondiscrimination in housing was the underlying principle
29. MALCOLM X., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 278 (1965). See also
BRANCH, supra note 27, at 507. Compared to drives for open schools or open
employment, “[h]ousing showed contrasting potential, even though relatively few
black people wanted or could afford to live in white neighborhoods.” Id. at xcvii.
30. See, e.g., STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER 
155, 155–64 (1967) (“The core problem within the ghetto is the vicious circle
created by the lack of decent housing, decent jobs and adequate education. The
failure of these three fundamental institutions to work has led to alienation of
the ghetto from the rest of the urban area as well as to deep political rifts between
the two communities.”).
   
     
  
   
    
      
  
      
   
   
 
            
          
      
      
          
       
          
  
         
           
            
         
          
 
         
           
     
      
     
 
        
      
     
        
      
          
          
            
      
  
     
         
       
20 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
in the nation’s first fair housing law, § 1982.31 By 1962,
President Kennedy’s Executive Order 11,063—“Equal
opportunity in housing”—enshrined the synthesis in its
preamble,32 followed by anti-discrimination provisions
mechanized by the threat of a withdrawal of federal housing-
related funds. This threat mechanism soon became Title VI
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, under which any recipient of
federal financial assistance was prohibited from 
discriminating on the basis of race.33 This purse-strings 
31. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 states: “All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as it is enjoyed by
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.” Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (later
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982). Just prior to passage of the Fair Housing Act, the
Supreme Court decided an important case that suggested anti-segregation and
the problem of the ghetto might be more appropriately subject to § 1982, based
on the Thirteenth Amendment. 
[W]hen racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their
ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic
of slavery. . . . At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered
to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy
whatever a white man can buy, the right to live where a white man can
live.
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 442–43 (1968). The Court distinguished
the two laws, calling § 1982 a “general statute applicable only to racial
discrimination in the rental and sale of property” and the FHA “a detailed
housing law, applicable to a broad range of discriminatory practices and
enforceable by a complete arsenal of federal authority.” Id. at 416–17 (emphasis
added).
32. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 24, 1962) (“WHEREAS
such discriminatory policies and practices result in segregated patters of housing
and necessarily produce other forms of discrimination and segregation which
deprive many Americans of equal opportunity in the exercise of their unalienable
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . .”).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964). The 1964 Act provides
in part: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” Id. Additionally,
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant,
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is
   
 
  
       
    
  
  
   
  
 
     
     
      
 
 
       
        
       
      
 
  
     
     
           
         
         
    
     
      
      
        
         
           
      
       
       
    
     
      
     
212017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
prohibition is repeated in Title VIII’s AFFH provision.
Meanwhile, the post-war exodus of whites to middle-
class suburbia was digging in and solidifying gains through
non-racial local legislation—primarily zoning. Just as 
Congress in the 1960s sought ways to dismantle
ghettoization through racially explicit non-discrimination
and anti-segregation law, homogenous white suburban
communities were altering zoning ordinances and regulating
the housing landscape to erect significant barriers to entry
by blacks, other minorities, and low-income renters through
facially neutral exclusionary zoning ordinances.34 The rise of
“localism,” discussed in Part III, became a lasting feature of
place-based inequality.35 
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of
this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with the achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
Id. at § 2000d-1.
34. As Richard Briffault explained:
[I]n many metropolitan areas exclusionary ordinances had region-wide
effects. By 1970, more than 99% of the vacant and developable land in
northeastern New Jersey was zoned to exclude multifamily housing. The
minimum floor space required of new homes in that part of the state was
one-third greater than that set by United States construction standards.
In Bergen County, 27,000 acres of developable land were zoned for
single-family housing and 131 acres for apartments. In Connecticut’s
Fairfield County, 89% of the vacant land was subject to minimum lot
requirements of one acre or more. Between 1952 and 1968, the average
size of a legally developable lot in New York’s Westchester County rose
from 0.3 acres to 1.5 acres. As a result, the county, which had been zoned
for a projected maximum population of approximately 3 million in 1952,
had been downzoned to a population maximum of approximately 1.75
million in 1969—a 40% drop during a period of rapid population growth.
Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1990).
35. See David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Re-segregation and
Equitable Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1111–12 (2008).
   
  2. The Twin Ideas in the Act’s Legislative History
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As Justice Kennedy noted in ICP,36 the Kerner
Commission Report was especially influential in crafting the
Fair Housing Act—sponsored by two of the report’s authors, 
Senators Edmund Brooke and Weaver. Open housing as the 
means to access opportunity was central to the analysis.
Commissioned to educate the nation about the causes 
beneath the violent riots and uprisings that had taken place 
across multiple cities in 1967, the report was quite clear that
the site of marginalized opportunity was the “ghetto,” a 
segregated repository of discrimination, whose isolation
threatened the promise of a democracy. Again, the Report
describes the “ghetto” as both a tangible, demarcated
geographic trap and a symbolic space of social and economic
negation. “What white Americans have never fully
understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that
white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and
white society condones it.”37 This immediate
acknowledgment of the ghetto as a racially contested space— 
36. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2515 (2015) (“De jure residential segregation by race was declared
unconstitutional almost a century ago, . . . but its vestiges remain today,
intertwined with the country’s economic and social life.”).
37. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 
(1968), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/8073NCJRS.pdf. This aspect
of the Commission’s findings had partisan repercussions in Congress, as fair
housing and Great Society legislation was being proposed by the Johnson
Administration. The language of white responsibility for black misery invited
backlash in many Congressional districts. As Marvin Weinbaum notes:
The Kerner recommendations were easily viewed as class legislation.
Namely, black America was designated as the prime, or at least the most
visible, recipient of any federal generosity. The Commission’s
admonition that the crisis of the cities would intensify in the face of
national inaction was viewed by some legislators as a form of blackmail
against the middle-class white taxpayer.
Marvin J. Weinbaum, Congress and the Commissioners: A New Species of 
Oversight, in THE KERNER REPORT REVISITED 127 (Phillip Meranto ed., 1970).
   
     
   
    
   
  
    
      
 
          
      
 
         
       
         
        
       
  
    
   
   
    
   
    
 
     
 
   
   
      
 
           
     
     
         
 
    
    
     
232017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
less frequently quoted than the Kerner Report’s famous
observation about two separate and unequal societies—is
instructive for its institutional focus. The ghetto is the sum
of its institutions, and few of them provide for the
opportunity of its residents. On the other hand, the Report 
found that institutions in suburbia played the opposite role,
fueling and sustaining markets of educational and economic
mobility.
[F]uture jobs are being created primarily in the suburbs, but the
chronically unemployed population is increasingly concentrated in 
the ghetto. This separation will make it more and more difficult for
Negroes to achieve anything like full employment in decent jobs.
But if, over time, these residents began to find housing outside
central cities, they would be exposed to more knowledge of job
opportunities. They would have to make much shorter trips to reach
jobs. They would have a far better chance of securing employment
on a self-sustaining basis.38 
The Kerner Commission and others recognized that fair
housing is fundamentally concerned with ameliorating the
harsh material consequences of segregation. Integration—or
“anti-ghettoization”—was perceived as the way to affect that.
The Report’s wide-ranging and systemic analysis suggested
the need for omnibus legislation, which Congress—even after
the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King—was perhaps 
unable to deliver. Its recommendations did little more than
confront, but not resolve, the problem of coordinated
programming among different levels of government, a
federalist dilemma for undoing marginalization that
operated at multiple, complex levels of society.39 Thus, an
38. For a full account, see Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing in Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public
Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333, 384 (2007).
39. Kitsos and Pisciotte noted this underlying dilemma for national
legislation when they observed:
In the face of the bewildering proliferation of both community demands
and local, state, and federal programs, mayors and city councils need to
create new mechanisms to aid in decision-making, program-planning,
   
   
    
    
 
    
       
     
 
   
 
3. Early Judicial Understandings of the Federal Fair
Housing Idea
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underlying tension in turning the fair housing idea into
national legislation was—and is—the question of whether it
could function as a civil rights statute of general
applicability.40 
As we will see next, anti-ghettoization arguments
permeated Senate hearing testimony on a bill that began as
H.R. 2516, a civil rights workers’ protection law already
passed by the House.41 
Senator Mondale’s language figured prominently in
early FHA decisions. In 1972, the Supreme Court decided a
standing case, Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,42 that endorsed two important housing policy ideas: the
nexus between discrimination and segregation as well as the
Act’s interests in promoting broader societal benefits. Two
tenants—one white, one black—of a large, San Francisco
housing complex sued to enjoin discrimination against
nonwhite tenants.43 They alleged three injuries arising from 
and coordination. At this time, however, no assistance is available to
develop these new and critically necessary institutional capabilities or
to support the required research, consultants, staff, or other vital
components of administrative or legislative competence. The
Commission recommends, therefore, that both the state and federal
governments provide financial assistance to cities for these purposes as
a regular part of all urban program funding.
Thomas Kitsos & Joseph Pisciotte, State Legislative Reaction to the Kerner
Commission Report: The Case of Illinois, in THE KERNER REPORT REVISITED, supra
note 37, at 99.
40. This is a complaint made by several courts. See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas,
430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005) (post-acquisition habitability); Vercher v.
Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 424 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (unequal police
services).
41. See Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 150 (1969).
42. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. Id. at 206–07.
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252017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
segregated living environments—the loss of “the social
benefits of living in an integrated community,” missed
business opportunities that would have accrued from 
interracial living, and embarrassment and alienation
resulting from the stigma of living in a “white ghetto.”44 The
lower courts had found that § 804 (discrimination in the sale
or rental) and § 810 (aggrieved persons) did not allow
standing for such suits and rejected their claims.45 While not 
deciding on the merits, the Court reversed, supporting not
only the need for broad standing under an Act whose aims
must typically be enforced by “private attorneys general,”
but the aims themselves. “While members of minority groups
were damaged the most from discrimination in housing
practices,” Justice Douglas wrote, “the proponents of the 
legislation emphasized that those who were not the direct
objects of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair
housing, as they too suffered.”46 In other words, fair housing
represents a broad interest in integrated living that is
frustrated by race discrimination and enforceable even by
those only indirectly discriminated against.
Trafficante’s oft-quoted use of Senator Mondale’s 
words—that “the reach of the proposed law was to replace 
the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living
patterns’”47—established the connection between the Act’s 
anti-discrimination goals and its anti-segregation goals. The
next year, this construction would control the decision in a
Second Circuit public housing case, even in the face of
equities that would seem to counsel a contrary result. In
Otero v. New York City Housing Authority,48 displaced black 
and Latino public housing tenants sued to enforce an earlier
47. Id. at 211. The Court also quoted Senator Javits, who said in support of
the bill that the victim of housing discrimination is “the whole community.” Id.
48. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
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decision by the housing authority that would put them ahead
of mostly white Jewish housing applicants for assignment in
new housing on Manhattan’s Lower East Side. The minority
plaintiffs had been moved out of their homes for
redevelopment purposes and promised apartments in the 
new development. For the housing authority, the interest at
stake was avoiding the risk of racial concentration by
keeping a mostly integrated neighborhood balanced.
Assigning minorities to the new units might invite racial
tipping and set the neighborhood on a course toward
ghettoization.49 The tension pit the authority’s constitutional
obligations to promote integration against its own
regulations favoring displaced low-income tenants.
Integration won. What is especially noteworthy about the
decision is its reliance upon what it calls the housing
authority’s “constitutional and statutory” duty “to act
affirmatively to achieve integration in housing.”50 This duty
to affirmatively further fair housing is contained in two parts 
of the Act and, as we will see later in Part III, has become
central to reviving the anti-segregation interest in fair
housing.51 The court discussed how the duty compels a
housing authority from siting public housing projects in
areas already racially concentrated (something housing
authorities routinely did).52 It summed up the Act’s interest
49. Id. at 1135 (“The ‘tipping point,’ or percentage of concentration of non-
white residents in a given area that will cause white residents to flee . . . .”)
50. Id. at 1133.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2016).
52. See Otero, 484 F.2d at 1133 (discussing Gautreax v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296
F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff’d, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970)); see also Crow v. 
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 383 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff’d, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972)
(describing the extreme concentration of public housing in majority black
neighborhoods across only eight of Atlanta’s 132 square miles); Recent Cases— 
Administrative Law—Urban Renewal—HUD Has Affirmative Duty to Consider
Low Income Housing’s Impact upon Racial Concentration—Shannon v. HUD, 436
F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), 85 HARV. L. REV. 870, 870–80 (1972) (addressing
numerous legislative and judicial responses to the phenomena of public housing
being concentrated in existing or soon-to-be racially isolated areas).
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 56.  Id. at 816–17. 
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in ensuring opportunity access through anti-discrimination
and anti-segregation: “Action must be taken to fulfill, as
much as possible, the goal of open, integrated residential
housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation,
in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the 
Act was designed to combat.”53 
These goals also had the effect of inscribing existing
federal housing law with Title VIII’s anti-segregation policy.
For instance, in Shannon v. U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development,54 plaintiffs successfully sued HUD for
failing to administer its housing insurance program 
procedures in a way that would affirmatively further fair
housing.55 The Housing Act of 1949 made no such 
requirement for urban renewal projects. At issue were 
changes to an urban renewal project that would alter the
original plan of single-family homes for sale to one of mostly
subsidized rental housing for low-income tenants (i.e.,
ghettoization) without a public hearing. Plaintiffs argued
that § 3608(d)(5) applied to the statutory definition of a
“workable program for community improvement,” and
required HUD to take racial concentration into account 
before insuring an amended housing plan in Philadelphia.56 
The Third Circuit’s language on the interplay is instructive,
showing how the progression of federal civil rights acts began
with anti-discrimination and continued toward anti-
segregation:
Read together, the Housing Act of 1949 and the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968 show a progression in the thinking of Congress as to
what factors significantly contributed to urban blight and what
steps must be taken to reverse the trend or to prevent the
recurrence of such blight. In 1949 the Secretary, in examining
whether a plan presented by a LPA [Local Public Agency] included
a workable program for community improvement, could not act
53. Otero, 484 F.2d at 1134.
54. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
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unconstitutionally, but possibly could act neutrally on the issue of
racial segregation. By 1964 he was directed, when considering
whether a program of community development was workable, to
look at the effects of local planning action and to prevent
discrimination in housing resulting from such action. In 1968 he
was directed to act affirmatively to achieve fair housing. Whatever 
were the most significant features of a workable program for
community improvement in 1949, by 1964 such a program had to be
nondiscriminatory in its effects, and by 1968 the Secretary had to
affirmatively promote fair housing.57 
As Trafficante, Otero, and Shannon demonstrate, the 
early case law was concerned with the very objects of policy
focus with which Congress and HUD struggled: How to
effectuate balanced and integrated communities across
jurisdictional boundaries through an Act whose explicit
terms only prohibited racial discrimination in housing-
related transactions. Trafficante is also significant for its
holding with respect to standing, interpreting the Act as
requiring the broadest possible reach in order to satisfy the
Act’s objectives.58 These cases, therefore, can be read to
57. Id. at 816. In language eerily prescient of conflicts to come, the court
discussed the then-previous tendency to focus on land use issues in a
destructively colorblind way:
Possibly before 1964 the administrators of the federal housing programs
could, by concentrating on land use controls, building code enforcement,
and physical conditions of buildings, remain blind to the very real effect 
that racial concentration has had in the development of urban blight.
Today such color blindness is impermissible. Increase or maintenance of
racial concentration is prima facie likely to lead to urban blight and is
thus prima facie at variance with the national housing policy.
Id. at 820–21. The practice would become the sina qua non of localist resistance
to integrated communities discussed at Section I.B.1.
58. The Court held that standing under the Act was defined “as broadly as is
permitted by Article III of the Constitution . . . insofar as tenants of the same
housing unit that is charged with discrimination are concerned.” Trafficante v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (internal quotation omitted). “The
language of the Act is broad and inclusive,” the Court wrote, and “the alleged
injury to existing tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the apartment
complex is the loss of important benefits from interracial associations.” Id. at
209–10. Standing challenges figure prominently in most of these cases.
   
    
   
  
  




     
    
     
     
 
           
            
         
         
       
       
      
       
 
        
 
     
          
       
 
    
     
             
        
     
         
    
     
           
      
           




establish a certain logic to the anti-ghettoization prong of fair
housing litigation: wage increasingly broad attacks on the 
segregative effects of particular forms of housing
discrimination while pushing the boundaries of standing in
order to demonstrate the broad zone of interests covered by
the Act. This branch of recorded decisions began with smaller
cases59 yet grew dramatically in the form of much larger, 
decades-long anti-segregation cases, such as United States v. 
60 61 62Black Jack, Gautreaux, United States v. Parma, 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of 
Arlington Heights,63 United States v. Yonkers Board of
64 65Education, NAACP v. Secretary of HUD, Resident
59. See, e.g., Gladstone v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 110–11, (1979)
(where village sued a real estate firm under the FHA for discriminatory renting
practices that caused racial segregation, the Court held that the village had
Article III standing to bring its claim partly on the basis of “[a] significant
reduction in property values,” because such a reduction “directly injures a
municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability to bear the
costs of local government and to provide services”); United States v. Mitchell, 580
F.2d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding racial steering to avoid integrated
community).
60. 508 F.2d 1179, 1186–87 (8th Cir. 1974) (invalidating Missouri city’s
zoning ordinance that prohibited multi-family housing).
61. 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff’d, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970).
62. 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1099–101 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (enjoining city’s pattern 
and practice of promulgating policies designed to discriminate against residency
by blacks).
63. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977).
64. 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
65. 817 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1987). Here, the NAACP sued HUD for failure to
enforce the AFFH obligation in the provision of Urban Development Action Grant
(UDAG) and Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds to Boston,
which contributed to segregation, a lack of open housing for blacks, a lack of
affordable housing, and the maintenance of segregated housing markets through
acts and omissions that trapped black renters in place. Id. at 151–52. Reversing
the trial court’s denial of a private right of action, the First Circuit said the city’s
conduct amounted “both to a violation HUD’s ‘minority housing needs’ regulation
and to a violation of HUD’s Title VIII duty to ‘affirmatively further’ the Act’s
policy.” Id. at 151. Further, the anti-segregation aim of the Act was violated. “This
broader goal suggests an intent that HUD do more than simply not discriminate
itself; it reflects a desire to have HUD use its grant programs to assist in ending
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Advisory Board v. Rizzo,66 and NAACP v. Town of
Huntington.67 Most were filed before the 1988 amendments
to the Act (though the litigations continued for many years), 
only to see a revival under the “affirmatively furthering” idea
in the 2000s. Together they point to a fair housing typology
that we will explore next in which some cases seek narrower
antidiscrimination remedies while others seek systemic anti-
segregation reform.68 It is the systemic end of the fair
housing spectrum that comes closest to what I will describe 
as metropolitan equity advocacy in Part III.
B.   “Systemic” Fair Housing Litigation in Context 
As approaches to fair housing matured, the distinction
between cases brought to end discrimination in housing and
cases brought to effectuate more systemic desegregation
became more important. Under the Act, both required a
finding of racial discrimination. But housing discrimination
discrimination and segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open
housing increases.” Id. at 155.
66. 564 F.2d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 1977) (affirming disparate impact case of
discrimination against Philadelphia for racial discrimination in the siting and
assignment policies for public housing on § 3604(a), but not § 3608(d)(5) grounds).
67. 844 F.2d 926, 928–29 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (affirming
disparate impact case of discrimination against Long Island municipality for
discriminating against blacks in construction of multifamily affordable housing
only in “urban renewal areas” and discriminatory refusal to rezone).
68. Seicshnaydre offers a different distinction, describing disparate impact
cases that target “barrier” regulation and others that target “improvement”
regulation.
A housing barrier regulation may operate in one of several respects: to
prevent the construction of housing that will likely be used by minority
groups in places that currently lack minority residents; to confine
housing that will be used by minority group members to neighborhoods
where minority households already predominate; or to otherwise deny
minority households freedom of movement in a wider housing
marketplace.
Seicshnaydre, supra note 7, at 360–61. The distinction is useful, particularly to
show how “barrier” regulations tend to further segregation. For these purposes,
I prefer “systemic” to describe a spectrum of litigation strategies meant to
advance the anti-segregation purpose of the Act. Systemic outcomes are also more
congruent with metropolitan equity remedies discussed in the next Part.
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as an instrument of exclusion could have different effects on 
opportunity depending on the theory of the case. The theory
of the case often reflected differences in the scope of remedies
sought, demanding both productive and disruptive reform.
The key to understanding the difference between cases on
one end of the spectrum or the other involves a focus on many
factors. Chief among them are:
•the character of the opposition to fair housing;
•the number of institutions implicated in the
discrimination;
•the extent of non-housing institutions implicated in
any outcomes sought by plaintiffs;
•the extent of history attacked by the case; and
•the nature of the fairness sought by the relief.
I illustrate these factors in some of the case law next.
Keep in mind that many of the most systemic cases include
a claim based upon the AFFH clause in § 3608, which we will
examine later in this Part. This connection became more
explicit last year when HUD finally released the final AFFH
rule and its associated compliance architecture.
Housing discrimination is not always systemic, a fact
reflected in the longstanding critique that the FHA is too 
atomized in protecting individual plaintiffs from harm.69 
69. See Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 
6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 384 (1988) (“[I]ndividual litigation victories rarely
can address large-scale patterns and practices of discrimination.”); see also John
O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1127 (1998) (“The rights-based strategy of fair housing, as
enforced by HUD and in the courts, is an ideological victory that nonetheless has
had insignificant effects in desegregating the metropolis and thereby improving
the material life of the ghetto poor.”); Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing
and Neighborhood Choice: Discrimination and Segregation in U.S. Housing
Markets, 41 IND. L. REV. 797, 805 (2008) (“[M]ost people who experience
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Sometimes discriminatory effects can be confined—part of a
societal pattern of exclusion no doubt, and therefore an act 
to preserve those patterns—relative to other discriminatory
conduct. Thus, the owners of an apartment complex that
refused to rent to blacks in Columbus, Mississippi engaged
in cognizable housing discrimination that, despite its
contributions to segregated housing markets, sits at the
narrow end of the fair housing spectrum.70 Many tester cases
share this place on the spectrum of discrimination.71 After
the FHA was amended in 1988 to include specific protection 
for people with disabilities,72 successful actions against
construction defendants for failure to adequately
accommodate physically challenged residents benefited
particular plaintiffs while prosecuting a new legal norm of
access on behalf of all disabled people.73 Discrimination
against persons based on family status was also added to the
discrimination fail to act . . . . [T]hey may not know that they have been victims
of discrimination.”); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23,
26 (1993) (offering the argument that “legal rights are essentially individualistic,
at least in the U.S. constitutional and legal culture, and that progressive change
requires undermining the individualism that vindicating legal rights
reinforces.”).
70. United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 779–80 (N.D.
Miss. 1972); see also HUD v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864 (11th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Harrison, 188
F. Supp. 2d 77, 79 (D. Mass. 2002); Oliver v. Foster, 524 F. Supp. 927 (S.D. Tex.
1981); Morgan v. Parcener’s Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Okla. 1978); United
States v. Gilman, 341 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
71. See, e.g., Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 377–78 (2d Cir. 1994)
(testers show Brooklyn realtors and landlords collude to discriminate by tenant’s
race and steer clients to certain neighborhoods); United States v. Habersham
Props., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1369–70 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A), 3604(f)(3)(C) (2012).
73. See Petty v. Portofino Council of Crowners, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 721,
725–26 (S.D. Tex. 2010); United States v. Quality Built Constr., 309 F. Supp. 2d
756, 759, 767 (E.D.N.C. 2003); United States v. Pac. Nw. Elec., Inc., No. CV-01-
019, 2003 WL 24573548, at *1, *45 (D. Idaho Mar. 21, 2003); Elliott v. Sherwood
Manor Mobile Home Park, 947 F. Supp. 1574, 1575–76, 1577 (M.D. Fla. 1996);
McKinney Found. v. Town of Fairfield, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1200, 1201 (D. Conn.
1992).
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Act in 1988,74 prohibiting discrimination against families
that was often a proxy for, or used in tandem with, race and
socioeconomic exclusion.75 The Act can also be used to
prevent one’s home from becoming a hostile living
environment on the basis of gender.76 All of these examples
show discriminatory conduct that marginalized people by
their race, disability, family status, and gender, which in the
aggregate contributes to a larger diminution in opportunity
across social spheres. But the particular means of
discriminating is institutionally specific and less far
reaching, with opposition that hardly organized. The fairness 
demanded by plaintiffs is straightforward: treat me and
others like me equally.
Further on the spectrum are cases in which the anti-
segregation nature of the claim against housing
discrimination is clearer. These cases may even implicate the
very history of the previous cases. For instance, the
wholesale removal of housing affordable to Latino day
laborers in a Long Island town through zoning action was
accomplished by organized institutional (local government)
policy, but also with the hindsight of decades of housing
discrimination against blacks in that very region.77 
74. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
75. See, e.g., Jancik v. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 554 (7th
Cir. 1995) (family status and racial discrimination in a suburban Chicago
suburb); Morgan v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 985 F.2d 1451, 1453 (10th Cir.
1993); Soules v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 822–24 (2d Cir.
1992). But see Easthampton Ctr. v. Twp. of Easthampton, 155 F. Supp. 2d 102,
121–22 (D.N.J. 2001) (FHA claim fails in light of SmartGrowth and tax ratables
concerns).
76. E.g., United States v. Gumbaytay, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145–46, 1150
(M.D. Ala. 2010) (Attorney General and female tenants sued apartment complex
owner, manager, and agents for serial acts of sexual harassment in connection
with housing conditions).
77. Rivera v. Vill. of Farmingdale, 784 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136–38 (E.D.N.Y
2011); see Hous. Rights Ctr v. Donald Sterling Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132,
1134 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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Advertising cases sit further down the spectrum because of
the institutional reach their practices may be presumed to
have.78 Advertising involves commercial campaigns to create
lasting mental associations among as broad an audience as
the advertiser can reach.79 As United States v. Hunter80 first
demonstrated, advertising implicates at least two
institutions in creating market perceptions, the press and
the housing vendor.81 Finally, pattern and practice cases by
their nature sit even further down the spectrum.82 They
represent routinely organized opposition to the Act’s goals of
inclusion, the conduct deemed “regular” represents policy
carried out by at least two, but sometimes multiple,
institutions and, because they occur over time, represent the 
defendants’ investment in historically exclusionary
practices.
Systemic fair housing cases are a different order of 
magnitude because, in addition to the factors listed above,
they seek both to produce significantly greater access to the 
institutions responsible for conferring opportunities and to
disrupt a range of institutional practices that exclude
protected groups from opportunity. The productive and
disruptive character of these suits is important. An FHA
cause of action that challenges segregative public housing
siting policy is seeking to produce greater access for public
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(c) (2012); Tyus v. Urban Search Mgmt., 102 F.3d
256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996); Hous. Opportunities Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 645–46 (6th Cir. 1991).
79. For an interesting analysis of fair housing advertising case dynamics, see
Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Racial Limits of the Fair Housing Act: The 
Intersection of Dominant White Images, the Violence of Neighborhood Purity, and
the Master Narrative of Black Inferiority, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 69 (1995).
80. 324 F. Supp. 529 (D. Md. 1971).
81. Id. at 530, 533.
82. Section 814 of the Act defines a pattern or practice as “resistance to the
full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 614(a)
(2012). Such alleged resistance must be proved to be more than “isolated
or . . . sporadic” acts of discrimination. United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916,
929 (7th Cir. 1992).
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housing tenants to attend better neighborhood schools, shop
in better stores, benefit from better-connected information
and employment networks, and enjoy more peaceful norms 
of interaction with law enforcement. In terms of housing 
alone, it is often designed to relieve chronic overcrowding. 
Thus, the productive character of systemic litigation affects 
multiple institutions in both the discrimination and the
outcome, attacks historical patterns of behavior, and
reinforces a notion of fairness based on equal access.
The disruptive character of systemic litigation is also
important as a means of achieving greater opportunity
through inclusion. The same public housing lawsuit, if
successful, may disrupt voting constituencies and electoral
boundaries. Recall that some early FHA cases almost
interchangeably discussed anti-segregation and anti-
ghettoization as statutory goals. Segregation is a leading
cause of ghettoization, but segregation and ghettos are not
the same thing. Ghettos, as the Malcolm X quote stated, are
isolated, dehumanizing places. When it comes to
supermarkets, the availability of insurance, and
opportunities for public school teaching, they are
“antimarkets”—often offering the least goods and services at
premium cost.83 Thus, ghettos were (and are) places of 
negation, where public law dominates84 yet private market
dynamics rarely benefit consumers. Anti-ghettoization is,
therefore, a process of undoing neighborhood negation. Fair
housing litigation that facilitates more racially diverse and
socioeconomically unpredictable migratory streams disrupts
83. David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket
Dichotomy and the Legal Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 427, 429 (2000).
84. This is meant quite literally. Because of high rates of public social
services use, residency in publicly regulated subsidized housing, heavy use of
public hospitals for primary health care, enrollment in public schools, and, most
importantly, disproportionate rates of involvement with the criminal justice
system, residents of ghetto neighborhoods interact with and are regulated by
more public institutions applying public law than anyone else in the United
States. Id. at 477–78.
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these institutional truisms. Not surprisingly, the opposition
to these cases is fierce and sustained. Opponents see historic
patterns of residential organization being fundamentally
challenged. The number of institutions that may be
foreseeably altered by the outcome is beyond simple
prediction. And the notion of fairness is reparative, a truly
equitable construct that goes beyond simple equality and
distribution, demanding more for others at the cost of
sharing. Thus, even as blunt instruments, systemic litigation
may be disruptive of entrenched patterns of inequality.
Examples of systemic cases do not abound, but they are 
legendary, if not for their transformative outcomes, then at 
least for their scope, duration, and potential. The Yonkers
case85 challenged the siting of the city’s only public housing
projects exclusively in the predominantly black
southwestern sector (as well as its segregated system of
neighborhood schools) over three decades.86 The district 
court found that the ward system had strengthened the 
resistance of neighborhood groups in all but the weakest
(most minority) neighborhoods, and a pattern and practice of
segregative intent over housing and school policy had become
an institutional norm of local government decision making.87 
With HUD funding, Yonkers city officials were creating
ghettos by ensuring the concentration of poverty and the
weak local institutions that accompany it. The judicial
remedy was intended to disrupt these institutional
arrangements.88 
85. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. Id. at 1376–77.
87. Id. at 1373. The court found pattern and practice, “the very essence of
which is the recognition that the illegal basis of actions may emerge clearly only
when the actions are viewed together.” Id. at 1374.
88. The particular strategy of creating or recreating ghetto areas within
cities is hardly unique to Yonkers. See, for example, the use of downzoning 
techniques in Philadelphia to impoverish a project for middle-income minority
residents in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 129–33 (3d Cir.
1977).
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Two early FHA cases show concerted attempts by
multiple institutions to maintain the ghetto on the other side
of municipal boundaries. In United States v. City of Parma,89 
HUD attacked longstanding policies by local officials to
maintain an all-white Ohio suburb through opposition to all
forms of public and affordable housing, enactment of
exclusionary zoning ordinances, rejection of federally
subsidized low-income housing development, and a refusal to
comply with Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 
requirements.90 Perhaps even more stark was the
organization of resistance to integrated communities in
United States v. Black Jack.91 White residents of 
unincorporated land outside of St. Louis learned that
townhouses affordable to residents of St. Louis ghettos would
be built there by a religious development group, and
successfully petitioned the state to incorporate.92 The St.
Louis County Council accepted the application over the
objections on legal, fiscal, and planning grounds of its own 
planning department.93 Once Black Jack became a
municipality, its council speedily passed exclusionary zoning
ordinances that barred the development project.94 Not only
did this exclusion have a clear racial impact (Black Jack’s 
population was only one to two percent black), but, the
appellate court noted, the enactment of the ordinance 
followed a predictable history of segregation by multiple
public and private institutions in the region.95 These 
89. 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
90. Id. at 1051–52.
91. 508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1974).
92. Id. at 1182–83.
93. Id. at 1182.
94. See id. at 1182–83; United States v. City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. 319,
323–34 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
95. The Eighth Circuit quoted from the district court opinion when it wrote:
The discriminatory effect of the ordinance is more onerous when
assessed in light of the fact that segregated housing in the St. Louis
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extraordinary (but not unusual) multi-institutional efforts to
attack historic segregation by white residents in two U.S.
municipalities show how systemic litigation under the Act 
aims not just at the crude instruments of inequality, but at
systems. Moreover, the systemic cases typically foreground
Otero’s anti-segregation command.
Finally, the mobility cases in some instances span the
entire history of the FHA and have come to crystalize the
goals of anti-segregative systemic lawsuits. Cases like
Gautreaux and Thompson are perhaps better known for the 
systemic goals contemplated by their remedies than their
strategic origins. In Gautreaux,96 liability for its racially
discriminatory and explicitly ghettoizing tenant selection
and assignment policies required the Chicago Housing
Authority to reverse its residential planning assumptions
and place low-income families in high opportunity and low
minority areas (disfavoring “Limited Public Housing Area”
and favoring “General Public Housing Areas”).97 The
demarcations were tied to census track data (initially
1970).98 The linchpin of fair housing here was racial and
poverty deconcentration.99 The most systemic move came
from the Supreme Court’s decision in a companion case to
disrupt the assumption created by Milliken v. Bradley100 that
metropolitan area was . . . “in large measure the result of deliberate
racial discrimination in the housing market by the real estate industry
and by agencies of the federal, state, and local governments . . . .”
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1186 (quoting City of Black Jack, 372 F. Supp. at
326).
96. Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
97. Id. at 737.
98. Id.
99. Beyond race and class, the court sought a dispersal of public housing
itself. “[Chicago Housing Authority] shall not concentrate large numbers of
Dwelling Units in or near a single location.” Id. at 739. No census tract should
contain more than fifteen percent of public housing units. Id.
100. 418 U.S. 717, 745–46 (1974) (limiting the remedy to the district where
disparate treatment was found.); see also Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143,
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any remedy must be limited to the Chicago city limits.101 This 
paved the way for truly regional residential planning for
inner-city public housing residents and the prospect for
regional mobility that was among the original purposes of
the Act. As a matter of both fair housing law and policy,
Gautreaux stands for the proposition that the benefit of fair
housing entails mobility to areas of (suburban) high
opportunity. While this is plainly anti-ghettoization, it is not
absolutely desegregation.
Filed more than a quarter-century after Gautreaux, 
Thompson v. HUD102 squarely attacked the post-Brown
history of segregation by HUD and the City of Baltimore. The
exclusively black, poor, and isolated environments resulting
from years of public housing policy had, by the mid-1990s,
represented the stubborn durability of ghettoization in the
era after white flight from cities.103 The theory of fair housing
in the case may be the most complete demonstration of
systemic litigation in the anti-segregation vein. Some
strategic choices may have been inevitable given the statute
of limitations. The historical wrongs alleged by plaintiffs 
against the local governmental defendants were time barred,
leaving only federal defendants. This required a statutory
claim against HUD for “its failure adequately to consider a
1151–53 (6th Cir. 1980) (requiring the district court to take all measures to
remedy the unconstitutional segregation despite the inability to completely
remedy the situation without a multidistrict approach).
101. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 297–306 (1976). Ultimately, the Court
found that Milliken merely prevented the restructuring of local governments that
did not violate the constitution. Id. at 297–98. It did not prevent the court from
requiring HUD to operate outside of Chicago where it had the authority to do so.
Id.
102. 348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005).
103. In 1995, the Schmoke administration in Baltimore was dealing with
competing crises, including an absolute need for affordable housing, reduced
federal involvement in its production, and the results of rapid demographic
change. Revitalization and desegregation were considered competing interests
for such mayors, and Judge Garbis found no intent to discriminate. Id. at 444– 
50.
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regional approach to desegregation of public housing”104 in
violation of § 3608(e)(5), the agency’s duty to administer its
programs in a manner to affirmatively further fair housing
policy. As Judge Garbis noted, this anti-segregation
obligation merely began with the duty not to discriminate,
but did not end there.105 With common-sense reasoning, the
court found liability for a failure to imagine public housing
options beyond the increasingly racially homogenous borders 
of Baltimore itself, “effectively wearing blinders” to the
adjacent region, even if the intent to discriminate was
unclear.106 The case is known for finding FHA liability in
HUD’s failure to desegregate through regionalization and for
the ensuing program of housing vouchers across counties 
adjacent to Baltimore.
We learn a lot about systemic litigation by examining the
plaintiffs’ myriad claims, though most were unsuccessful.
The Thompson case was brought against three mayoral
administrations, HUD, and the Housing Authority of
Baltimore County, and alleged intentional discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the FHA, and other
Acts in the siting of public housing and tenant assignment
policies, the erection of a chain-link fence around one 
predominantly black housing project that abutted a white
neighborhood, demolition without replacement policies, and
pattern and practice violations. Plaintiffs did not explicitly
allege concerted action among so many defendants, but
rather a pattern of intersecting institutional practices that
together supported segregated housing patterns within the
city.107 
Thompson is notable for an expansion of § 3604(a) and
(b) claims, and an intriguing argument to overcome statute
104. Id. at 408.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 409.
107. Id. at 407–08. A comprehensive and incisive account of Thompson can be
found in Roisman, supra note 38.
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of limitations issues amid claims of historic discrimination.
§ 3604(a) states that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or
rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny . . . a 
dwelling to any person because of race.” The court noted that
a government entity can effect a constructive denial of a
housing opportunity, especially as housing agencies turn to
more “intangible” housing programs and subsidies.108 
Considering § 3604(b), which prohibits discrimination “in the
provision of services or facilities in connection” with housing,
the court affirmed an expansive reading of actionable
housing services discrimination.109 Though not dispositive of 
the outcome in Thompson, the court’s favorable view of
constructive denials of housing opportunity and housing-
related services under the Act supports broader
interpretations of the Act’s reach. Further, the court affirmed
plaintiffs’ assertion of the “dissipation of vestiges” theory to
extend the statute of limitations. Given the history of 
segregation and segregatory policy by local government in
Baltimore, there were plenty of past violations that plaintiffs 
wanted to claim as continuing violations. But evidence of a
past violation was not admissible to prove a continuing
violation, according to the court. However, the court said that
the present violation may be the government’s failure to
remedy the continuing vestiges of the prior violation. Thus,
proof of the past violation “would be admissible to establish
the fact of the past violation as an element of a ‘dissipation
of vestiges’ claim.”110 
These details matter. They provide some insight into
how the Act’s scope may expand, even in the face of statute
of limitations challenges. The answer appears to be the use
108. “Indeed, in an era where housing authorities are transitioning from the
provision of ‘hard units’ to the administration of more intangible housing
programs involving vouchers etc., a broad reading of § 3604(a) is appropriate to
continue to hold government entities accountable under the subsection.”
Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 415–16.
109. Id. at 416.
110. Id. at 426.
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of empirical data to establish relationships of inequality that
arise from active discrimination, legacy segregation, or both
acting in concert.
Information analysis of structural inequality is central
to the Court’s disparate impact ruling in ICP, as we will see
next. It is also the very soul of HUD’s recent rule on AFFH, 
the clearest statutory pronouncement that Title VIII is an
anti-segregation law.
The Supreme Court gave a considerable boost to the
public’s contemporary understanding of legacy segregation
when it decided Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project.111 The
case was widely presumed to be an opportunity for the
conservative justices to disallow proof of disparate impact in
FHA claims because the justices had accepted two previous
FHA cases on that question (both settled), a question that
was not in conflict among the circuits.112 Kennedy’s opinion 
for a 5-4 majority sometimes recalled the spatial dichotomy
that prevailed in the era of the Act’s passage, describing the
ICP’s allegation of “granting too many credits for housing in
predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in
predominantly white suburban neighborhoods.”113 The facts
required the Court to choose between two possibly
contradictory federal statutes, the FHA and the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit.114 The latter specifically provided for
placing affordable housing in already low-income areas. The
majority held that the FHA’s statutory purpose as a means
111. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
112. See Twp. of Mt. Holly v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2824 (2013) (granting certiorari on the question of whether disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA); see also Magner v. Gallagher, 132
S. Ct. 548 (2011) (granting certiorari on the question of whether disparate impact
claims are cognizable under the FHA).
113. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2514 (emphasis added).
114. See id. at 2513 (discussing 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(III), (d)(5)(ii)(I)).
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to eliminate racial isolation held sway. Central to the holding
was the fact that the Act anticipated changing modes of 
discrimination by allowing claims under a theory of
disparate impact. According to the Court, “[i]t permits 
plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised
animus that escape easy classification as disparate 
treatment. In this way disparate-impact liability may
prevent segregated housing patterns that might otherwise
result from covert and illicit stereotyping.”115 This language
is unusual, especially at this time, as is the majority’s 
recognition that discriminatory housing patterns are 
systemic. Yet it follows from the majority’s understanding of 
Congress’s intent in related civil rights laws. Like
employment and age discrimination statutes, wrote Justice
Kennedy, “antidiscrimination laws should be construed to
encompass disparate-impact claims when their text refers to
the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of
actors, and where that interpretation is consistent with
statutory purpose.”116 Thus, the Court affirmed the 
fundamentally consequentialist framework of disparate
impact claims of housing discrimination.
However, by leaving disparate impact intact as a mode
of proof in fair housing cases, the Court validated the central
empirical role of disparate impact analyses in opportunity
claims. If ICP had outlawed disparate impact in Title VIII
matters, it arguably would have cast doubt on the larger use
of data about disparities and disproportionate burdens that 
is central to the revival of AFFH. As we will see shortly, the
AFFH rule is a data-driven mechanism for integration (with
the use of HUD data, no less). In Part III, we will see how
the move toward increasingly complex empirical
demonstrations of facts on the ground characterizes
metropolitan equity analyses. The ICP Court did not modify
115. Id. at 2522.
116. Id. at 2511.
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HUD’s recent disparate impact rule.117 It tightened
causation requirements in ways that will be tested by
judicial interpretation in future cases.118 Yet in doing so it
validated the larger role for analytical proof of structural
inequality.
Finally, the ICP decision also illustrates the original
concept of merging the FHA’s twin ideas—that is, that
eliminating the denial of housing opportunity by race will
eliminate segregation. Justice Kennedy employed strong 
language affirming the Act’s dual purposes and recognizing
the work ahead. “Much progress remains to be made in our
Nation’s continuing struggle against racial isolation.”119 
However, the ICP Court dealt with segregation as a source 
of inequality caused by discriminatory policy and not the
larger ill of segregation for its own sake. While ICP is
arguably an example of systemic fair housing litigation (by
challenging a practice that may lead to habitual re-
segregation),120 it is just barely so, with plaintiffs able to
117. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct at 2514–15 (describing the
disparate impact definition and test in HUD regulations); Implementation of the
Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, Executive Summary, 78
Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (“Under this test, the charging party or plaintiff
first bears the burden of proving its prima facie case that a practice results in, or
would predictably result in, a discriminatory effect on the basis of a protected
characteristic. If the charging party or plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the
burden of proof shifts to the respondent or defendant to prove that the challenged
practice is necessary to achieve one or more of its substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests. If the respondent or defendant satisfies this burden,
then the charging party or plaintiff may still establish liability by proving that
the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest could be served by a
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”).
118. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct at 2523–24 (finding that facts or
statistical evidence will be needed to demonstrate a causal connection when
pleading).
119. Id. at 2425.
120. Note, however, that being able to leave the ghetto for the suburb was one
of the quintessential routes to equal opportunity that the Act was originally
meant to achieve. See 114 CONG. REC. 2277, 3421 (1968) (statements of Sen.
Mondale).
   
    
   
     
      
       
  
 
   
 
3. Anti-segregation and HUD’s Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing Rule
    




   
    
   
    
   
    
   
  
 
      
      
       
     
        
         
          
     
 
       
   
  
              
 
452017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
challenge a single Department of Community Affairs’ policy
of tax credit allocation in high-minority, low-opportunity
areas. This source of segregation is less common than the
cumulative legacy of public and private policies that have
shaped residential organization in the United States. For
that to be reached, there must be a more affirmative
obligation to promote integration.
One significance of the 2015 HUD final rule on AFFH
(the “Rule”) is as a policy document resolving questions of the 
Act’s true underlying interest in “fair housing,” its purpose, 
and permissible scope. The interest, according to numerous
references throughout the Rule, is opportunity access. Yet 
advancing that interest is achieved under the Rule through 
the other half of the Act’s purpose: active and studied anti-
segregation planning. Thus, the Rule acknowledges the
weakness of the previous attempts121 to inform recipients of 
the problems associated with fair housing through the
Analysis of Impediments (AI) process, and replaces it with a
better tool, the Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH), for
documenting and overcoming such barriers to opportunity.
The breadth of the definition of AFFH is almost limitless:
[A]ffirmatively furthering fair housing means taking meaningful
actions that, taken together, address significant disparities in
housing needs and in access to opportunity, replacing segregated
living patterns with truly integrated and balanced living patterns, 
transforming racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty
into areas of opportunity, and fostering and maintaining compliance
with civil rights and fair housing laws. The duty to affirmatively
further fair housing extends to all of a program participant’s 
121. HUD, A NEW ASSESSMENT PROCESS TO AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER FAIR 
HOUSING 2 (2015), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/pdf/
affht_userFriendlyGuide.pdf (“the parameters for the [Analysis of Impediments]
are not clear enough, HUD provides no data, and the standards of review are not
transparent”).
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activities and programs relating to housing and urban 
development.122 
What remains for later discussion is how far this
commitment goes in extending the scope of relevant
activities.123 For now, it is worth examining how the
definition of AFFH dislodges the anti-segregation aspect of 
the Act from the anti-discrimination prong.
The Rule elevates anti-segregation by two means,
directly and indirectly—through the requirements for using
federal funds (direct) and the compliance process (indirect).
The Rule directly emphasizes anti-segregation by declaring
it the purpose of the AFH124 and developing an even more
extensive set of data analyses than before. Under the
Assessment Tool,125 for instance, very little about community
and regional planning is not also fair housing. Add in the fact
that a fairness standard is implied along with an opportunity
interest over all, and it is even harder to imagine any
housing-related program that is not also a consequential part
of fair housing.
The AFH makes at least four substantive requirements
of recipients. First is the analysis of fair housing, using HUD-
provided data to study trends in segregation, racially
concentrated areas of poverty, significant barriers to
opportunity access, and disproportionate housing needs 
segregation; racially or ethnically concentrated areas of poverty; disparities in
access to opportunity; and disproportionate housing needs based on race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, national origin, and disability.” 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)
(2016).
125. See HUD, ASSESSMENT OF FAIR HOUSING TOOL 1–5, app. C at 7,
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Assessment-of-Fair-
Housing-Tool.pdf (assessing community regional characteristics, such as
transportation and location of employers under the fair housing analysis).
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experienced by protected classes.126 This, as we will see in
the next Part, is a quintessential metropolitan equity
inquiry—here as an open-ended investigation for any and all
recipients of HUD funding. Second, is an “assessment of fair
housing issues” that elaborates on the preceding 
requirements.127 This is followed by the identification of fair
housing priorities and goals, which include prioritizing
contributing factors in the applicant’s discussion.128 Goals,
and the strategies for achieving them, must be formulated
and defended.129 All of these requirements must be subjected
to community participation and public comment. There are
additional compliance requirements for civil rights laws and
equal employment opportunity.130 
Indirectly, the Rule elevates the anti-segregation
interest in the way that its compliance provisions work. 
Before the Rule, the AI was a voluntary effort made by the
recipient and kept by them. Recipients now must incorporate 
the AFH into their consolidated plan and submit it to HUD
as certification that they do indeed affirmatively further fair
housing. Even then, HUD may reserve the right to challenge
compliance or seek additional assurances.131 The
Department effectively keeps a recipient’s developed record
of segregation and may do nothing, reject it, or demand
modifications.
Mirroring so much metropolitan equity work, the 
comprehensive goals of the AFFH process (racially balanced
communities of opportunity) and expanded scope (a wide
variety of institutions important to opportunity production)
indicate a modernized view of inequality that is structural
and complex. The Rule clearly delineates a concept of fair
126. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(2) (2016).
127. Id. § 5.154(d)(3).
128. Id. § 5.154(d)(4).
129. Id.
130. See id. § 570.904(a)–(b).
131. Id. §§ 5.166(b), 570.304(a).
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housing that encompasses far more than housing:
A program participant’s strategies and actions must affirmatively
further fair housing and may include various activities, such as
developing affordable housing, and removing barriers to the
development of such housing, in areas of high opportunity; 
strategically enhancing access to opportunity, including through:
Targeted investment in neighborhood revitalization or 
stabilization; preservation or rehabilitation of existing affordable
housing; promoting greater housing choice within or outside of
areas of concentrated poverty and greater access to areas of high
opportunity; and improving community assets such as quality
schools, employment, and transportation.132 
It has the potential to require far more substantial anti-
segregation initiatives by municipalities and other recipients
than ever before.
But what really compels compliance? The consequences 
are far from clear. The AFFH contains no private right of
action as other violations of the Act do, though HUD may still
be sued under the Administrative Procedure Act for failure 
to administer its programs in a manner that affirmatively
furthers fair housing.133 Not being accepted appears to be the
132. Id. § 5.150.
133. P.R. Pub. Hous. Admin. v. HUD, 59 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324 (D.P.R. 1999).
See also Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 1984)
(describing two bases for suing HUD: when the Department discriminates and
when the Department fails to enforce compliance with the Act against a recipient
of whose discrimination it is aware).
This has been a consistent complaint from fair housing advocates about the
drafting of the final rule. The National Commission on Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity, for instance, argued the following:
[T]he Fair Housing Act contains no administrative procedure for HUD
to accept a complaint based on Section 3608 . . . . In addition, because
the Act does not include violation of Section 3608 as one of the provisions
that the Department of Justice has authority to enforce, the federal
government has no ability to enforce Section 3608 in court. Also, even in
private actions brought in court, the deferential standards of review
under the Administrative Procedure Act make it very difficult to prove
liability against the federal government. Finally, because of sovereign
immunity, even if they are successful in their injunctive relief claims,
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only threat, and even that does not appear to doom a
recipient’s funding. Against a backdrop of resistance at least
two generations old, the AFFH rule contains everything
necessary to a housing-based idea of equal access to
opportunity except a reliable enforcement mechanism.
The analyses in this Part would not be complete if we
failed to acknowledge the constitutional role of race-
conscious remedial action by courts and agencies responsible
for housing policy, especially in the context of systemic
litigation. This may be proclaiming the obvious, but unlike 
many areas of law affecting racial inequality, fair housing
has survived contests over intentionality that have
privileged “color-blind” framing of inequality as “societal” or
“economic” rather than racial. This seems true for two
primary reasons.
First, the compelling governmental interest against both
racial discrimination and segregation are, as we have seen in
this Part, well-established in the legislative history,134 
Congressional amendments,135 executive orders,136 and
agency action.137 Despite the strong pull of the color-blind
frame, a governmental interest in the policy of fair housing
makes at least pleading racial injury easier than, say,
civil rights plaintiffs may not be able to recover damages from federal
and state entities for violations of § 3608.
NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR
HOUSING app. A (Dec. 2008), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/ 
fairhousing/emerging.html.
134. See discussion supra Section I.A.2.
135. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
136. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,527 (Nov. 24, 1962); see also
Exec. Order No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2,939 (Jan. 20, 1994).
137. See, e.g., Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272
(July 16, 2015).
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seeking racially integrated schools or workplaces. Cases
brought in both the anti-discrimination and the anti-
segregation veins must show specific racial impact. Proof of
disparate impact depends upon demonstrating patterns of
racially discriminatory decision making and the resulting
causation of measurable racial impact, to the exclusion of
other primary causes, a framework left undisturbed by the
Court in ICP. Similarly, HUD’s recent AFFH rule reminds 
users at multiple turns to take race into documented account 
in analyses of fair housing, from racial history, to the history
of racialized policymaking, to racially disparate educational
and employment outcomes, and the formulation of plans to
eliminate those disparities as a condition of HUD’s 
acceptance. At least in the area of federal fair housing law
(state laws have taken other approaches),138 the
constitutional language we use to describe racial inequality
in residential organization relies unapologetically upon
racial terms, categories, and experiences.
Second, it may be easier to discuss racial injury in fair
housing law because lawyers do not believe they have to rely
upon race in the remedy phase. Remedies, as we will see later
in the discussion of metropolitan equity, tend to be spatial,
where racial proxies abound. Siting decisions or portable
voucher use can be designated in economic terms (e.g., “low-
poverty areas”) without reference to the specific racial
composition of the geography.139 Indeed, many housing
138. For example, the New Jersey Fair Housing Act was modeled after the
state Supreme Court’s nonracial Mt. Laurel doctrine, a complicated affordable
housing program based on meeting “fair shares” of regional housing need based
on socioeconomic, rather than racial, status. See discussion infra Section II.C and
accompanying notes.
139. For example, Justice Kennedy’s description of the ICP plaintiff’s
allegations uses the language of race and its euphemisms in consecutive
sentences:
ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segregated housing
patterns by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits, granting
too many credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and
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programs aimed at some degree of integration use race in
everything short of the final outcome, such as marketing of
units to racially identifiable applicant pools and the 
collection of racial data for program administration. Outlier
cases, such as Walker v. City of Mesquite,140 may also have
contributed to a reticence among civil rights plaintiffs to
couch remedies in explicitly racial terms. And remedies that 
give preference to individuals by race or that employ racial
quotas are almost certainly unable to overcome strict 
scrutiny.141 
However, it is worth considering whether the FHA
should operate on more racially specific remedial terms, and
if so, how. Commentators have offered several grounds for
too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods. The ICP
contended that the Department must modify its selection criteria in
order to encourage the construction of low-income housing in suburban
communities.
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2514 (2015).
140. 169 F.3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999). The case involved white homeowner
associations objecting to racially specific housing programs arising from the
consent decree in Walker v. HUD, 734 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Tex 1989), in which
new housing opportunities were to be built in “predominantly white areas.”
Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d at 977. The white homeowners alleged that
such racially specific plans singled them out for various disadvantages arising
from the building of public housing nearby. Id. at 979. The Fifth Circuit agreed
and held that the plan was not narrowly tailored enough to avoid harm to third
parties and entertain less onerous alternatives, such as voucher programs. Id. at
985. However, a subsequent remedial plan, meant to remove the offending racial
language yielded the same siting result but relied on economic indices and
measures of segregation. See Walker v. City of Mesquite, 402 F.3d 532, 534–35 
(5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096,
1103 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding racial quotas impermissible for the purpose of
“maintain[ing] a fixed level of integration”).
141. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (“It is well established that when the government distributes
burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is
reviewed under strict scrutiny.”); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. at 2512 (“Remedial orders that impose racial targets or quotas might raise
more difficult constitutional questions.”).
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using race explicitly,142 including the interest in “avoiding
racial isolation” announced by Justice Kennedy in Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1.143 We might consider four other arguments. First, the
persistence of racial segregation makes all non-racial
alternatives possible. That is, the emphasis on socioeconomic
place, mapped opportunity indexes, or other analogous
measures effectively mimic racial outcomes only because of
the measurable presence of racial segregation. Explicit use
of race removes the mask of euphemism and more directly
effectuates the compelling interests behind the Act. Second,
as we will see more fully in the next Part, colorblind end-runs
around anti-segregation programs, such as our system of
local sovereignty, have created or reproduced patterns of
segregation that may be more sustainable than the de jure
forms they replaced. Continuing to seek nonracial remedies
may indirectly encourage the strategy of nonracial end-runs 
by reifying the nonracial framework. Third, systemic
problems may demand direct remedies. It is precisely the
underlying racial network of interacting exclusions in
systemic housing cases that demands a more frontal
approach to exclusion by race. Fourth, because poverty is not
a protected class, race must continue to be available as a
proxy for disadvantage. This argument turns the earlier ones
on their collective head, but it is no less persuasive as a
practical matter. Sometimes race discrimination is the only
constitutional route to addressing class discrimination.
There are arguments against race-conscious remedies,
too. First, because public buy-in is so important to systemic
change, accommodation matters. This argument counsels us
142. E.g., Adam Weiss, Grutter, Community, and Democracy: The Case for
Race-Conscious Remedies in Residential Segregation Suits, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1195, 1196–98 (2007).
143. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); See generally Philip Tegeler, The Future
of Race-Conscious Goals in National Housing Policy, in PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE 
LEGACY OF SEGREGATION (Margery Austin Turner, Susan J. Popkin & Lynette
Rawlings eds., 2009).
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to read the prolonged resistance to “balanced and integrated
living patterns” as evidence of something more than law can
transform, a durable and material expression of socially-
constructed identities in conflict. Failure to accommodate
these amorphous divisions by projecting racial remedies (and
implied explanations) onto them will be counterproductive
and contribute to even more cultural polarization than we
already have. Second, even if the FHA’s plain language
describes clear racial interests, the culture’s language has
changed. The common avoidance of racially explicit language
in a country where it was once so prevalent is not an
insignificant phenomenon, the result only of clever
conservative manipulations. Generations now understand
these terms differently but without consensus on what they
mean. This contributes to an overall confusion that can be
counterproductive to fair housing goals. Therefore, where 
better-understood alternatives exist, use them.
However, there is something else: privilege. Without
resolving the arguments on both sides, let me posit that a
modern characteristic of racial exclusion that complicates
the traditional analysis of race-conscious remediation is the
mindset of privilege. Privilege—white and otherwise—is as
much the character of resistance to racial inclusion as
anything else. The Francis Howell school district parents
from the Introduction may speak in a code known to some as 
racist, but their overt concern is the preservation of privilege.
They want to keep the situation they bought, which they
understand as access to middle-class opportunities for their
children. These are settled expectations for them and
millions of Americans, who often regard these social
purchases as rights. Is the self-interested preservation of 
social gains racist because it follows consistent patterns of 
racial exclusion? Put another way, is defense of a “right” to
accumulated privilege—especially asserted by whites—that
systematically devalues the presence of nonwhite (and non-
Asian) members a manifestation of their racism? This is
really a question of the scope of the Act. In 1968 and the first
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decades beyond, it is probably fair to say that most of the 
country recognized “discrimination” and “segregation” as the
instruments of racism. The confusion I allude to in the
argument above may reflect the transformation from
patterns of racially distributed benefits established by overt
racism into patterns of entitlement that have been re-
established on nonracial terms. This may be less an issue of
unconscious racism than it is one of opportunity hoarding
along racially unconscious but no less demonstrable lines.
This is a significant problem for a framework that relies upon
past constructs of harm and liability to accurately portray
and dismantle racially identifiable barriers to opportunity
today.
Resolving the ultimate issue of the Act’s scope requires 
the work of the rest of the Article. The resolution of how race
consciousness works can only be done here if we properly
understand racism itself. Whatever its particular
manifestations, racism is at bottom the devaluation of
personhood based on race. It requires both the ability to
devalue and the capacity to impact important aspects of what 
it means to be a person. Institutional racism achieves this in
material ways. Much of this understanding is conflated in a
constitutional—now social—regime in which most racism
remains stuck in notions of overtly expressed animus and
clear intentionality. Some settings have become so “color-
scared” that the mere mention of race earns the speaker the 
label of “racist.”144 It is fortunate that a Supreme Court
majority in opinions like ICP has recognized the persistent 
institutional character of racism that pervades residential
organization in the United States. With judicial recognition
of persistent racial devaluations, attempts to justify the
hoarding of racial privileges as nonracial entitlements can
fairly be viewed as a modern expression of institutionalized
racism. They must continue to qualify for race-conscious
144. For instance, later in their meeting, many in the Francis Howell crowd
accused a parent concerned with racial exclusion of being a racist for even raising
the issue of race. See The Problem We All Live With, supra note 1.
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remediation under our laws. The Thompson case exemplifies
the calcified layers of once-racial policies at the core of a race-
neutral landscape in Baltimore County. The crisis of
institutional racism sanitized by nonracial privilege
hoarding sits in Thompson’s doctrinal crosshairs: 
opportunity denial, under-resourced facilities related to
housing and housing policy that failed to dissipate the
vestiges of past discrimination out of the unwillingness to
cross the jurisdictional boundaries of privilege. Important as
it is, however, resolving the question of racism and race-
conscious remedies brings us only a little closer to figuring
out how the Fair Housing Act may increase equitable access
to opportunity across metropolitan America.
C.  Conclusion 
This Part began with the origins of fair housing law in
two ideals, anti-discrimination and anti-segregation, both
undeniably freighted with racial terminology and manifest
in geography. The analysis proceeded to show how the two
goals interact (and occasionally conflict) for the primary
statutory purpose of opportunity access and production.
Systemic impact litigation showed some of the Act’s potential
in seeking more than racially balanced neighborhoods but
also inclusion in the resources necessary for greater
opportunity for residents of isolated “ghettos.” The AFFH
rules promulgated by HUD codify this idea in a complicated
apparatus of regional research tools designed to show not
only physical distance between the affluent and economically
disadvantaged minorities, but also the distance from 
resources that the latter experience. Nonetheless, little has 
effectively moved metropolitan areas beyond the hoarding of
residential privilege. These shortcomings of fair housing
policy have given rise to multidisciplinary advocacy called
“metropolitan equity,” the study of disparities in opportunity
access across regions. As we will see, these remedial
ambitions lack the enforcement power of a civil rights
statute, even one as notoriously weak as the FHA. The
   
    
    
   
 
   
     
   
     
     
    
  
 
      
     
     
     
    
  
    
    
     
   
     
   
   
  
    
   
 
             
      
       
       
   
56 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
problem, I argue, is the lack of a theory of structural
inequality underlying, if not uniting, both fair housing and
metropolitan equity. We make that theoretical turn in the
next Part.
II. A LEGAL THEORY OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY, THE 
EQUITY PRINCIPLE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF A METROPOLITAN 
EQUITY REMEDIAL FRAMEWORK 
Despite the attention given to rising levels of inequality
in the United States over the past several years, very few
scholars discuss place-based inequality among the causes or
cures.145 This is a glaring omission that may have something
to do with the disciplines from which these thinkers come. If
the nation’s rough idea of inequality can be boiled down to a
lack of access to opportunity, then the structure of inequality
is more accountable to where one lives than to more popular
analyses of the jobs one holds or the income one earns.
Market-centric critiques of relative economic opportunity are
valuable, but they miss the local environments in which 
skewed markets are first manifest. Thus, a legal theory of
structural inequality has to comprehend the broader
environment in order to explain how more proximate
geography determines access to economic opportunity. It
must say something compelling not just about relative access
to financial capital, but about our relative access to the 
means of developing social and human capital as a means to
financial capital. It must also speak to re-segregation, the
strongest force dividing people from opportunity based on
place. As we have seen, the Fair Housing Act’s equal
opportunity approach to ending racial segregation is co-
extensive with ending racial discrimination in housing. But
what if inequality arising from segregation is not as often
145. Not, for instance, such influential scholars as Thomas Picketty or Joseph
Stiglitz. Neither discusses residential segregation as a significant contributing
factor in rising inequality. See generally THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW 
TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012).
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activated by actionable housing discrimination? What if the
most impactful discrimination is tangled amid policies and
practices whose motives are at best mixed, if discernible at
all? What if some re-segregation outcomes are better 
understood as the unequally distributed benefits that flow
systematically out of intergenerational privilege? That is the
problem confronted by the theory of structural inequality
that follows.
A.  Structural Inequality Under Law—Place, Institutions, 
and Inequitable Rules 
Before positing a theory of structural inequality, it is
important to set forth briefly what happened to sustain
segregation after the most overt means of housing 
discrimination—insurance and mortgage redlining, racially
restrictive covenants, blockbusting, steering, and outright 
discriminatory refusals to rent or sell—were outlawed. It was
localism, the form of local governance, or local sovereignty,
most associated with suburban municipalities in many parts
of the country, especially the Northeast, Midwest, California,
and Texas. The 1970s-era jurisprudence of both fair housing
and exclusionary zoning is replete with cases in which
facially neutral exercises of local sovereignty were
challenged—usually unsuccessfully—for their exclusionary
and segregative effects.146 Scholars have explained the
deference given these segregative arrangements under the
cloak of non-racial local governmental decision making.147 
146. See United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 564–65, 578–79 (6th
Cir. 1981); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 493 (1975); Vill. of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1974); but see also United States v. City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179, 1181–82 (8th Cir. 1974); S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975).
147. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING CITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 77 (1999); Briffault, supra note 34, at 45–48; Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 383–85 
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They have ably described how jurisdictional boundary
making created insiders with voice, and outsiders without,
on police power issues of zoning, land use, educational
finance, and districting. Others have defended its
exclusionary exercises of the police power on legislative
(home rule) and democratic grounds.148 Yet rare has been the
assertion of its accountability for the re-segregation that
habitually followed mass suburbanization.149 
Re-segregation through suburban localism externalized
risk from stronger to weaker municipalities; the latter were 
unable (or in some cases unwilling) to exclude less desirable
uses (power stations, sewage treatment facilities,
multifamily housing) and people. Affordable housing—either
subsidized housing or housing whose market rates are 
affordable to lower-income occupants—concentrated in 
particular towns, almost always nearest the central city. The
white flight that characterized the 1950s and 1960s simply
fled farther out into the metropolitan periphery. What
protected homogeneity under localism, however, was not
race-based discrimination (although overt housing
discrimination by race continues to occur). It was mainly the
pattern of municipal markets, “favored quarters” with well-
resourced institutions, that followed wealth and zoning,
political power and sheer distance from critical masses of
people of color.150 Rational planning principles and basic 
truisms of public finance helped to normalize localism as a
way of life. “Our localism,” as Richard Briffault called it,151 
did not have to be understood consciously as racial
(1990); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1874 (1994).
148. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOME-VOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW
HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND
LAND-USE POLICIES (2001).
149. Troutt, supra note 35, at 1145–46 (2008).
150. Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985,
2003, 2012 (2000).
151. Briffault, supra note 34, at 5.
   
    
   
   
     
   
     
   
     
 
   
   
       
    
      
   
   
     
     
     
    
       
     
 
              
       
      
      
     
        
          
     
   
          
      
      
      
     
         
     
      
  
592017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
separation. It was merely the rational preservation of
household investments actualized with predictable
consistency according to the same demographic patterns.
Thus, what localism did was to instantiate many of the
cultural values supporting resistance to integration in the
1960s by monetizing the financial value of segregation and
rendering it self-executing. That the resulting system of
preferences is race neutral by its terms makes it almost
impossible to reform.
Most importantly, the racially and economically
segregated system of preferences was almost impervious to
legal remedy. Racially neutral exercises of local control over
community character and basic services consistently
received judicial support under rational basis review. Even
the more liberal state supreme court education finance cases
of the 1980s defer to the importance of preserving local
control in spite of the resource inequality they produce
between districts.152 Similarly, in the exclusionary zoning
realm, even the handful of states that scrutinized the extra-
local effects and regional cost-shifting associated with such 
land regulation left undisturbed the fundamental primacy of
local control.153 As we will see, the critique of localism would
152. E.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1021 (Colo. 1982)
(“The historical development of public education in Colorado has been centered
on the philosophy of local control.”); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165
(Ga. 1981); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 788–90 (Md.
1983); Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,
367–69 (N.Y. 1982); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati v. Walter,
390 N.E.2d 813, 821–22 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State,
746 P.2d 1135, 1146, 1149 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 146–47 (Or.
1976), superseded by constitutional amendment, OR. CONST. art. XI, § 11a.
153. See, e.g., Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Vill. of Upper Brookville, 414 N.E.2d
680, 682–85 (N.Y. 1980) (sustaining five acre minimum lot requirement); see also
Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 511 N.E.2d 67, 69–71 (N.Y. 1987)
(sustaining local zoning that made no provision for multifamily housing); N.
Shore Unitarian Universalist Soc’y, Inc. v. Incorporated Vill. of Upper Brookville,
110 A.D.2d 123, 124, 128 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (facially valid zoning ordinance
not invalidated where market forces prevent multifamily home construction);
Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 99–100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)
(describing the rational basis review to which a zoning ordinance is subjected).
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become unduly tied up in the quest for regionalism (or a
“New Regionalism”) when, as the next section demonstrates, 
localism is best understood as merely one engine of
persistent structural inequality.
Table 1. Structural Inequality—Theoretical Elements
Interest Equal access to opportunity
Source of Opportunity Public and private institutions
Measures of Inequality Resources (fiscal, in/tangible)
Lens Comparative formal and 
informal rules and customs
Standard Equity (appropriate fairness)
Units of Analysis PLACE: Metropolitan regions,
race, and class
Outcomes Fairer rules, lower disparities
Structural inequality is the organization of spatial
inequality. The table above summarizes the key elements of
the theory of structural inequality and represents a reverse-
engineering of the inequalities described earlier. Before we
discuss it, consider a tale of three municipalities that stretch 
in a line from a central city in perpetual near-renaissance.
All three represent important trends in place-based regional
inequality. Adjacent to the City is an inner-ring or “first 
suburb” that had once been a working- to upper-middle class
suburb, but has seen successive waves of white flight and
declining tax base since even before the City’s defining civil
unrest in 1967. Between 2000 and 2010, black and Latino
students have remained 99% of the town’s school district 
population,154 the percentage of kids qualifying for free and
154. Student Demographics, EDUC. LAW CTR., (Oct. 14, 2016), 
http://www.edlawcenter.org/research/data-research.html (select “Historical
Data” then Select District “Irvington Township” and Select School Year “1999– 
   
     
       
         
 
    
    
      
   




     
        
 
   
  
 
    
  
 
     
  
 
     
  
 




     
   
  
 




reduced meal lunch (a measure of poverty and near poverty) 
is 74%,155 and median household income has risen modestly
to $38,165156 from $36,575 in fourteen years.157 Town #1 is
85.4% black,158 66.6% renter,159 and had a 2014 family
poverty rate of 28.4%.160 
Town #2 is just a few miles down some of the main
thoroughfares that form a megalopolis away from the City.
It represents the upper half of a place urban scholar David
Rusk and I call a “DIMI,” a diverse and inclusive, moderate-
income municipality.161 Its median income of $116,014 shows
that it is more substantially middle income than moderate162 
(the regional median was $99,631 in 2010).163 Its 3:1 ratio of
2000”); Id. (select “Current Data,” then select race under “Select Race/Ethnicity”).
155. Id. (select “Current Data,” and refer to “Students in Special Programs”
and select indicator “Free/Reduced Lunch”).
156. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/S1901/0600000US3401334450 (last visited Oct. 
13, 2016) (2014 Irvington, N.J. Income Census Data).
157. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/00_SF3/DP3/0600000US3401334450 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016) (2000 Irvington, N.J. Income Census Data).
158. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/DP05/0600000US3401334450 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016) (2014 Irvington, N.J. Race Census Data).
159. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/DP04/0600000US3401334450 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016) (2014 Irvington, N.J. Housing Census Data).
160. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/S1702/0600000US3401334450
0600000US3401334450 (last visited Oct. 13, 2016) (2014 Irvington, N.J. Poverty
Census Data).
161. See discussion infra Section II.C.
162. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/S1901/0600000US3401343800 (last visited Oct. 
13, 2016) (2014 Maplewood, N.J. Income Census Data).
163. TOGETHER NORTH JERSEY, FAIR HOUSING & EQUITY ASSESSMENT REPORT
(2015) http://togethernorthjersey.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/FHEA_ 
Report_031715.pdf.
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owners to renters164 and availability of some, mostly market 
rate rental apartments suggests a tradition of inclusiveness 
that is more than accidental and a fragile state of racial
integration. In fact, this town stands out for its overt
embrace of diversity, which sometimes means that its
realities, such as racial achievement gaps in its schools, 
frustrate a proud mythology and are often downplayed. Town
#2 is 30.2% black,165 22.2% renter,166 and had a 2014 family
poverty rate of 5.8%.167 
Town #3 sits along the same county arteries but has seen
its racial diversity increase primarily through the addition of
Asians (15.7%) to its overwhelmingly white population
(80.1%).168 It is a classic suburb: affluent and stable. Between
2000 and 2010, the percentage of black and Hispanic school
children in its highly ranked schools has barely changed at
3%.169 Nor has the percentage of children receiving free and
reduced lunch increased beyond 2%.170 But job growth in a
164. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/DP04/0600000US3401343800 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016) (2014 Maplewood, N.J. Housing Census Data).
165. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/DP05/0600000US3401343800 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016) (2014 Maplewood, N.J. Race Census Data).
166. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/DP04/0600000US3401343800 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016) (2014 Maplewood, N.J. Housing Census Data).
167. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/S1702/0600000US3401343800 (last visited Oct. 
13, 2016) (2014 Maplewood, N.J. Poverty Census Data).
168. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/DP05/0600000US3401346380 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016) (2014 Millburn, N.J. Race Census Data) (the Asian population is
primarily Chinese and Asian Indian).
169. Student Demographics, supra note 154 (select “Historical Data” then
Select District “Millburn Township” and Select School Year “1999–2000”); Id.
(select “Current Data,” then select race under “Select Race/Ethnicity”).
170. Id. (select “Current Data,” and refer to “Students in Special Programs”
and select indicator “Free/Reduced Lunch”).
   
     
    
      
 
      
    
   
     
   
    
     
    
      
       
      
      
    
     
      
     
       
 
     
    
   
 
     
  
 
    
  
 
     
  
 
           
  
632017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
municipality scaled primarily for single-family
homeownership has risen dramatically. Nevertheless, Town
#3 is only 1.9% black,171 has a median income of $165,944,172 
and a poverty rate of just 2.9%.173 
There are several observations to make about the
comparative status of these towns that help to define a
theory of structural inequality. The first is that we are
comparing them at all and doing so within a regional lens.174 
Although each pretends to stand on a separate but equal
existential footing—a home rule grant, the common interest
in stability, governed by local sovereignty—they have a
historic relationship to each other that is often competitive,
adversarial, and occasionally cooperative. This is because the
character of localism in a regional context reflects societal
beliefs in free enterprise. Each place is born equal with
certain unalienable rights to compete in a metropolitan
competition for tax base, effective exclusions, and stable
growth. Town #3 wants never to be Town #1. Town #1 bears
the burdens that Town #3 has effectively disowned and still
cannot believe how like the central city it has become. Town
#2 is an ambivalent buffer between them, wanting to become
neither, providing grist for both.
Second, they exist on a spectrum of racial and economic
segregation “so deeply imbedded in the national psyche that
many Americans, [African Americans] as well as whites,
171. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/DP05/0600000US3401346380 (last visited Oct.
13, 2016) (2014 Millburn, N.J. Race Census Data).
172. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/S1901/0600000US3401346380 (last visited Oct. 
13, 2016) (2014 Millburn, N.J. Income Census Data).
173. American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/14_5YR/S1702/0600000US3401346380 (last visited Oct. 
13, 2016) (2014 Millburn, N.J. Poverty Census Data).
174. How we define that region for purposes of metropolitan equity framing is
another matter.
   
     
    
  
   
     
     
     
     
  
     
  
   
    
      
 
    
  
    
     
  
     
     
     
   
   
 
  
    
     
     
    
     
 
         
        
      
   
64 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
have come to regard it as a natural condition.”175 The central
city in this example happens to be Newark, New Jersey, and
the three towns happen to be Irvington, Maplewood, and
Millburn. Particulars of our DIMI study of Northern New
Jersey are relevant later. For now, in the Greater Newark
region, like Ferguson, Missouri and its relationship to
metropolitan St. Louis, or the Dallas or Cleveland or New
Orleans metro areas, it is important to note how a similar
pattern holds: poverty has spread to close-in suburbs 
(sometimes as a result of gentrifying central cities) along
with much greater numbers of black, Latino, and recent 
immigrant residents. Economic growth has accelerated in 
more homogenous white and increasingly Asian suburbs
farther away. The twin paths do not cross or, if they do, not 
for long.
Third, the prospects for a life of middle-class
opportunity—“mobility”—are generally as strong as each of
the towns’ public and private institutions that connect people 
with opportunity (i.e., human and social capital). These
institutions are rooted in place. This is an important aspect 
of the theory of structural inequality advanced here. Many
accounts of place-based economic disadvantage focus on poor
places, including the relative efficacy of key institutions
there. But this is to examine only half of the picture of
structural inequality. If we focus only on Irvington’s 
challenged institutions, we have an analysis of inner-ring
decline. But if we compare Irvington’s institutions with the
same institutions in Millburn, we have an analysis of
metropolitan inequality. When we add in the institutional
dynamics in Maplewood, we have a more formidable basis for
reaching conclusions about how opportunity is destabilized
or preserved. Therefore, a theory of structural inequality
175. Richard Margolis & Diane Margolis, The Ghetto and the Master Builder, 
in NAT’L COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUS., HOW THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT BUILDS GHETTOS (1967). I replaced the word “Negroes” that appears
in the original text with the more contemporary “African Americans.”
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652017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
sees key public and private institutions as the sites and
sources of opportunity production or denial.176 
The focus on institutions has long played a role in the
discourse on inequality in other disciplines. The sociologist
C. Wright Mills famously observed how people’s lives are 
enacted within the institutions to which they have access.
“Much of human life consists of playing roles within specific 
institutions. To understand the biography of an individual,
we must understand the significance and meaning of the
roles he has played and does play; to understand these roles 
we must understand the institutions of which they are a
part.”177 Because the focus in sociology is often on the effect 
of social structures on inequality,178 the definition of an
institution sometimes seems to differ from how a lawyer
might define one. Mario Smalls and Scott Allard distinguish
“organizations” (e.g., schools, churches, welfare agencies,
childcare centers) from “institutions” (“formal rules or
informal norms governing the behavior of individuals and
organizations,” e.g., rules about parole release).179 Although
the differences are not great, I prefer the more simplified
“institution” for a legal theory of structural inequality. The
crux of the legal analysis—beyond the identification of the
relevant institutions—is the formal and informal rules that 
govern activity within each organization, since that is more 
176. See generally Scott W. Allard & Marion L. Small, Reconsidering the 
Urban Disadvantaged: The Role of Systems, Institutions, and Organizations, 647 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6 (2013).
177. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 161 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 2000).
178. See, e.g., ANNETTE LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND 
FAMILY LIFE 14 (2003) (“There are many definitions of social structure, but they
generally stress regular patterns of interaction, often in forms of social
organization. The key building blocks are groups (or, in one common definition,
‘collections of people who interact on the basis of shared expectations regarding
one another’s behavior’).”) (citation omitted).
179. Allard & Small, supra note 176, at 9.
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typically the focus of legal inquiry. The question is not only
what are those rules and operating norms, but why do they
operate differently based on place. Thus, we focus on
comparisons of key institutions in order to assess the
disparate outcomes their rules produce and to subject the
operation of those rules to an equity standard.
Next, a theory of structural inequality has to identify
which institutions are indeed key to opportunity access. The
challenge is to recognize the diversity of institutions that
affect life prospects differently in different places yet to try,
where possible, to isolate those that are common to
community life in most places. Therefore, traditionally public
institutions such as schools, public safety, parks and
recreation, transportation access, and housing policy are
most important. They consume the bulk of locally generated
tax revenues and fit within many of the powers of local
government. They are also central to notions of residential
preference. People choose to live in communities where that
choice represents an investment in their children’s college
and career readiness, quality of life, convenient commute
times, a sense of democratic fulfillment, if not participation,
and, very importantly, an appreciating asset in the home.
Public institutions encourage private markets through 
economic development projects, infrastructure spending,
crime control, the provision of public goods, and tax
incentives. This in turn attracts job growth, health care
providers, shopping and food districts, and the proliferation
of important community institutions, like churches, 
childcare, and the arts. In this way, the public sphere is
inextricably connected to the private. Yet in places where
residents have fewer choices, public institutions can signal
the market in other ways. Public social services offices that 
serve a low-income clientele, for instance, are an amenity for
central cities because of their proximity to the poor but a
disamenity in a prosperous suburban town. Therefore, 
structural inequality becomes, at least from helicopter
height, a comparison of relative institutional strengths as
   
   
 b. Institutional Resources
   
       
   
     
  




    
     
  
     
      
     
 
   
     
 
  
   
       
 
            
       
           
       
         
    
       
 
 
       
      
 
672017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
well as the actual institutions available to residents.
Those relative strengths can be measured in resources. A 
sound tax base provides the revenues for an ample school
budget, for example, but of course funding is not the only
resource that determines the quality of a learning
environment. Effective leadership, experienced teachers,
advanced training, and the capacity to offer a wide range of
instruction using up-to-date materials in a modern facility
are also resources affecting educational outcomes. At least as
important a learning resource is the presence of middle-
income peers, classmates ready and able to learn, and an
absence of violence or other serious safety concerns.180 The
resources that support strong educational institutions,
therefore, are often only indirectly connected to funding. A 
similar distinction holds between the financial and
intangible resources associated with other community
institutions.181 
Since resources can be measured both quantitatively
(e.g., tax base per capita) and qualitatively (e.g., a pervasive
sense of safety), the types of institutional resources that are 
most meaningful are those that produce access to 
opportunity by contributing to the growth of an individual’s 
social capital. One’s social capital reflects one’s level of
180. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY STUDY
193, 290, 325 (1966); LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND 
EDUCATION (Teachers College Press 2010); JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES APART:
ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN
AMERICA 15 (2010); See also SARAH AMY & MELISSA TOOLEY, THE EDUCATION
TRUST, BUILDING AND SUSTAINING TALENT: CREATING CONDITIONS IN HIGH-
POVERTY SCHOOLS THAT SUPPORT EFFECTIVE TEACHING AND LEARNING 1, 2 (2012)
(http://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Building_and_Sustaining_
Talent.pdf).
181. See, e.g., Nicole P. Marwell, Privatizing the Welfare State: Nonprofit
Community-Based Organizations as Political Actors, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 265, 274
(2004).
   
   
    
   
  
   
 
     
 
   
    
     
   
       
     
     
   
  
     
  
  
     
 
c. Institutional Rules and Norms Against an Equity
Standard
        
      
    
    
       
   
 
       
    
     
          
         
     
         
         
 
68 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  65
engagement with diverse social networks where we gain
local information, develop shared interests, and make 
collective decisions. But it is not magic. The social capital we
acquire within institutions needs the bonds of social
inclusion. For example, sociological experiments from the
mixed-income, mixed-race context have shown that when 
former public housing rental tenants in Chicago shared
mixed-income residential developments with middle-income 
dwelling owners in the same development, the benefits of
integration only went so far.182 As Robert Chaskin’s work
shows, mixed-income communities reveal a mixed record on
creating “truly balanced living patterns” because the 
institutional rules and norms created to foster social capital
made public housing tenants feel watched, ignored, and
excluded.183 Thus, under structural inequality theory, we
examine institutional rules and connections for the purpose 
of developing a more inclusive sense of collective efficacy. For
the wealthy, this is often taken for granted. For the poor, the 
reliance on institutional resources can be more important in
determining access to opportunity.
So far (and referring to the summary Table 1 at the
beginning of this Section), structural inequality theory
privileges the interest in equality of opportunity and
opportunity access. It recognizes that this interest is
typically advanced or retarded in and by important public
and private institutions common to most communities. For
182. See Robert J. Chaskin, Integration and Exclusion: Urban Poverty, Public
Housing Reform, and the Dynamics of Neighborhood Restructuring, ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 2013, at 237, 250–52.
183. Id. at 256 (“Thus, integrationist efforts aimed at normative and cultural
integration . . . are experienced by many low-income and relocated public housing
residents as mechanisms of exclusion, control, and stigmatization that, rather
than promoting their positive social integration, lead them to withdraw to avoid
negative sanctions and protect their eligibility to continue to live in the
development.”) (citations omitted).
   
  
    
     
    
     
  
      
        
      
   
   
 
    
    
    
       
 
  
    
   
 
      
   
   
    
      
  





    
     
  
    
692017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
each institution, we can objectively measure the resources 
available to people there—even if we sometimes disagree
about what constitutes a resource—and make some
judgments about the relative resource strength of 
institutions. But how those resources are deployed matters,
too; the last example about public housing tenants suggested
that the very rules meant to increase a sense of connection 
and social capital worked to stigmatize and exclude them.
The critical inquiry for a legal theory of structural inequality
entails identifying and interrogating the formal and informal
rules governing those institutions that are at least partly
responsible for producing unequal outcomes, which we look
at next.
Assume for illustration that the relevant institution is
public education. We understand that the governing rules
are essentially the same for weak and strong schools, flowing
from notions of local autonomy in the administration and
financing of schools but subject to state education laws. The
differences in educational outcomes, however, reflect how
those rules affect relative resources (e.g., ability to attract
and retain well-trained teachers, facilities, extracurricular
support, etc.) in different places. Therefore, the structural
inequality analysis of public educational institutions would
entail an interrogation of how the school financing
disparities result from facially equal but substantively
unequal laws rooted in localism. We will expand upon the
public school example momentarily, but the next step is to
introduce the standard by which an interrogation of 
comparative institutional rules occurs under structural
inequality theory: equity.
If equity is the standard, what is equity? The term 
“equity” is almost as ubiquitous as it is amorphous, though 
it is an ancient legal principle that we sort of know when we
see. Its ambiguity may be intentional, since equity usually
resonates with a sense of fairness, and fairness is usually the
fact-dependent subject of compromise. We read it expressly
in the term “fair housing.” We fall back upon it when
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equitable relief is allowed in the absence of legal remedies.184 
Family law scholars argue its necessity over strict notions of 
equality.185 In some feminist scholarship, equity is a
contested alternative to equality that more fully evokes
notions of justice.186 The push for equitable frameworks over
equality has for a long time characterized school finance 
litigation187 as well as environmental justice,188 where 
184. Black’s Law Dictionary begins its lengthy definition of equity like this:
“Justice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly 
formulated rules of common law.” Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
185. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Reflections on Equality in Family Law, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1385, 1410 (2013) (“[T]he legal concept of ‘equality’—alone—is
inadequate to achieve real justice in family law issues. Equitable considerations
also are indispensable. Indeed, usually equity must predominate for a fair
outcome to be achieved in many (most) family cases and policy issues.”).
186. See, e.g., Alda Facio & Martha I. Morgan, Equity or Equality for Women?
Understanding CEDAW’s Equality Principles, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1133, 1136
(2009) (“Equity is not the same as equality, and at the same time, not all
inequality can be seen as inequity. The notion of inequity adopted by [the World
Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization] is that of
‘unnecessary, avoidable and unjust inequalities.’ Therefore, while equality is an
empirical concept, equity represents an ethical imperative associated with the
principles of social justice and human rights.”) (citation omitted); Maria
Herminia Graterol & Anurag Gupta, Girls Learn Everything: Realizing the Right
to Education Through CEDAW, 16 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 70 (2010)
(“[E]quity often evokes ideas of ‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ that may be grounded on
patriarchal ideologies and the concept of formal equality.”) (citation omitted).
187. See, e.g., Alexandra Rose, Comment, For the Kids: A Place for Equity in
Kansas School Finance Litigation, 63 KAN. L. REV. 1205, 1232
(“Equity is a broad concept encompassing many areas but can be generally
understood as a ‘body of principles constituting what is fair and right.’ Equity
comes in many forms, but those most important to school finance are horizontal
and vertical equity. Horizontal equity aims to decrease disparity between
similarly situated school districts. Vertical equity aims to treat differently
situated districts differently by moving the bottom up. Scholars today believe that
horizontal equity should not be the courts’ only focus; instead, the courts should
focus on vertical equity.”) (citations omitted).
188. See, e.g., Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental Racism:
Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1267 (1998) (“The
underlying premise of environmental equity is that fairness in environmental
decision-making would result in even distribution of environmental risks and
burdens, with all groups bearing a proportionate share.”); Duncan A. French,
International Environmental Law and the Achievement of Intragenerational 
   
     
   
      
      
       
     
  
  
      
    
 
  
    
      
 
       
     
       
      
        
        
        
     
       
         
 
             
          
   
      
       
           
           
    
          
      
     
         
           
       
     
712017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
fairness is often seen not in terms of absolute equality but
rather in terms of fulfilling proportionate needs and
balancing proportionate burdens. This aspect of 
proportionality associated with equity but not equality is
also behind many critiques of conservative approaches to
civil rights.189 For structural inequality theory, equity is the
exercise of fairness necessary to finding the appropriate
balance of equality based on demonstrable, proportionate
need. Put simply, when one applies equity to equality, one is
not seeking to get the same thing as other persons, but the
necessary things in order to enjoy the opportunities that
others often take for granted.
Disability law provides the purest example of equity,
since we demand (through the Americans with Disabilities
Act190) equal access for people challenged by a physical
Equity, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10469, 10476-77 (containing a well-articulated analysis
of the importance of equity-based thinking in the context of environmental
policy); Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity: A
Proposed Siting Model, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 375, 380 (1994) (“‘Environmental
equity’ is the equal distribution of environmental risks (including risks associated
with hazardous waste facilities) across race, ethnicity and income. As stated by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): ‘Environmental equity is an
important goal in a democratic society. It involves ensuring that the benefits of
environmental protection are available to all communities and an environmental
policy-making process that allows the concerns of all communities to be heard,
understood, and addressed.’”).
189. For instance, when Chief Justice Roberts wrote in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007), that
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race,” critics asserted that he was simplifying equality, locking in a
status quo that disproportionately favors already advantaged groups in society
at the expense of those whose inequality of opportunity is manifest. See Ronald
Turner, “The Way to Stop Discrimination on the Basis of Race . . .”, 11 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 45, 87–88 (2015).
190. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213
(2012). “[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem . . . .” Id. at § 12101(a)(2). “[T]he Nation’s proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
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disability, but we satisfy that demand by making costly
accommodations that many of us will not use. Let’s take a
more difficult example of disability, the relative incidence of
student psychological trauma, to show the equity principle in
institutional and comparative practice. Public schools in both
Irvington (working class) and Millburn (wealthy) generally
follow the same formal state rules about education, though
many policies differ depending on the school, the district, its
leadership, and the student body. All schools are subject to
federal disability laws that protect the rights of children of 
all abilities to a free and appropriate education.191 However,
schools in high poverty areas like Irvington’s East Ward
educate high rates of children who are classified as requiring
special education under disability law but perhaps many 
more whose learning capacity is diminished by the effects of
psychological trauma.192 Psychological research has long
individuals . . . .” Id. at § 12101(a)(7); see also Fair Housing Act § 6(f)(1)–(3), 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)–(3) (defining unlawful discrimination against handicapped
persons to include the failure to permit individuals to make reasonable
modifications to a residential unit when necessary due to handicap, or to
construct an adaptable design in multifamily units, containing “an accessible
route into and through the dwelling . . . light switches, electrical outlets,
thermostats, and other environmental controls in accessible
locations . . . reinforcements in bathroom walls to allow later installation of grab
bars; and . . . usable kitchens and bathrooms such that an individual in a
wheelchair can maneuver about the space”).
191. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act § 682(d)(1)(A), 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (describing the Act’s purpose as “ensur[ing] that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to
meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment,
and independent living”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–97, 701(b), 794a.
192. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MINORITIES IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, 65– 
80, 86 (2009) (addressing overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities
receiving special education classification). See also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(24) (“The
State has in effect . . . policies and procedures designed to prevent the
inappropriate identification or disproportionate representation by race and
   
   
     
    
  
        
  
  
   
    
     
   
    
 
   
 
    
  
 
   
    
    
    
 
     
       
 
          
       
        
     
         
  
           
     
   
      
     
  
          
       
732017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
demonstrated the disproportionate rates of psychic trauma
among children from poor neighborhoods relative to their
more affluent peers. While trauma affects school kids in all
districts, including high-opportunity areas like Millburn,193 
trauma caused by shootings and other community violence,
parental separation, domestic abuse, and other factors is far
more pervasive among Irvington’s classrooms. These
“complex” traumas have a destructive effect on both 
cognitive development and academic performance (and many
other aspects of life prospects).194 As a matter of legal
obligation in the best educational interests of children, 
prevalence of trauma and resulting impairment makes early
identification and intervention by school personnel critical.
Unfortunately, the same institutional rules governing
the accommodation of school children suffering the effects of
complex trauma operate differently depending on the
school’s composition and available resources. In low-poverty
schools, there is evidence that children’s psychological needs 
are met with greater resources. In high-poverty schools, on
the other hand, psychological trauma is rarely addressed, 
leaving students at significant risk of poor academic
outcomes.195 Because a lot of childhood trauma is manifest 
ethnicity of children with disabilities . . . .”).
193. See Adverse Childhood Experiences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 
www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/acestudy/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2016).
194. See NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, Complex Trauma, in
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 5 (Alexandra Cook et al. eds., 2003) (defining
complex trauma as both “exposure to traumatic events and the impact of this
exposure on immediate and long-term outcomes”). See also CHERYL LANKTREE ET
AL., INTEGRATIVE TREATMENT OF COMPLEX TRAUMA FOR CHILDREN (ITCT-C): A
GUIDE FOR TREATMENT OF MUTIPLY-TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN AGED EIGHT TO 
TWELVE YEARS 9 (2008) (“Complex trauma is typically defined as a combination
of early and late-onset, multiple, and sometimes highly invasive traumatic
events, usually of an ongoing, interpersonal nature. In most cases, such trauma
includes exposure to repetitive childhood sexual, physical, psychological abuse,
and/or family violence, often in the context of concomitant emotional neglect and
harmful social environments.”).
195. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Peter P. v. Compton Unified
Sch. Dist., No. CV 15-3726, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134772 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29,
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through disruptive, sometimes violent behavior, it often
contributes to school suspension and other educational
disruption. School suspension is in turn highly correlated
with dropping out, criminal activity, and incarceration—the 
so-called “school-to-prison pipeline” that typifies diminished
opportunity. Equity would require that the resource 
allocations necessary to effectuate the disability rules’
objectives be increased for high-poverty schools, but that is
rarely the case.196 Hence, because of where the schools are 
located, the same legal rules do not work as effectively for the 
children most in need.
What the example further demonstrates is that equality,
like inequality, is an outcome that can be measured in finite 
terms, but equity is a process that directs the achievement of 
equal outcomes. Right now, we can speculate that the
Millburn schools devote greater resources to helping children 
who are experiencing significant psychological trauma cope
and perform academically than the Irvington schools can.
But even equal resources would discount the relative need
because Irvington’s children face more trauma. Equity is the
principle that should govern how the difference is made up.
Finally, the equity standard helps us to comprehend the
character of intersectionality in structural inequality. Even
more than institutional racism, structural inequality
involves the cumulative force of inequitable rules denying
opportunity among multiple institutions at once. “Structure”
2015).
196. Another example compares the substance and availability of Advanced
Placement courses by district composition. Advance Placement classes follow a
state standard under laws applicable to all schools, but while they are
commonplace at Millburn High School, they are less so and with different
substantive elements at Irvington High. The inequity of this inequality of
challenging coursework, so critical to college achievement and mobility prospects,
is revealed in stark terms between a poor black district and a rich white one. But 
even more of the detailed operation of informal institutional rules is revealed by,
for example, Advance Placement eligibility and tracking trends in a racially and
economically mixed high school like Columbia High, which serves Maplewood.
Complaint at 7, NJCLU v. S. Orange-Maplewood Sch. Dist.,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/ocr_complaint_vs_somsd.pdf.
   
     
    
   
     
   
   
    
      
     
   
    
   
    
    




refers to the layers of institutionalized race and class
disparities operationalized in place. The primary institution
responsible for affecting one’s access to places with relatively
helpful or destructive institutions is housing policy. As an
institution, housing policy is a diffuse example of 
intersectionality in inequality. Housing policy is divided
among public agencies when it is subsidized, sited, and
approved by local government through zoning and land use
policies, and built and maintained by private markets.
Because housing policy implicates not only education policy
but also parks and recreation policy, infrastructure policy,
economic development policy, health care policy,
transportation policy, and many others associated with
belonging to a particular place, fair housing involves most
directly the civil rights interest in overcoming structural
inequality.
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Having set out a legal theory of structural inequality, we
can now contrast it with the theory of opportunity access and
denial that is embedded in the Fair Housing Act. Similar but
not the same, the comparison will facilitate the connection 
between fair housing and metropolitan equity, the ultimate
goal of this Article. As Table 2 illustrates, the two theories
   
   
    
     
  
 
   
    
   
  
    
 
 
       
      
    
 
    
   
     
       
  
  
   
    
   
 
          
            
        
         
         
      
         
       
      
 
772017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
share the same legal interest, equality of opportunity.
However, the primary source of opportunity is different.
Structural inequality theory posits institutions (including
housing) while fair housing singles out housing opportunity. 
Note how the Act’s focus on housing helps to determine a
different measure of the problem—the absence of 
discrimination and the presence of integration, rather than
the presence of effective resources. The Act’s anti-
discrimination/anti-segregation measures then drive the 
legal frameworks for addressing them—proof of intent or
disparate impact to show either racial discrimination or
unjustified racial concentration. The two frameworks also 
differ on the standard. Fair housing carries a rights-based, 
not equity-based, standard—harder to enforce today, but 
certainly much clearer than fairness. The difference in units
of analysis is also telling. Fair housing may be limited to a
single unit of housing or expandable to a “region.” Structural
inequality is always concerned with larger units of analysis,
particularly trends at the metropolitan level. 
This is in part a reflection of their different underlying
ideas about causation. Contemporary structural inequality
is born of a facially colorblind policy tradition characterized
by the sedimentation of intergenerational privilege and the
vestiges of overt race discrimination. It attributes the cause 
of much inequality to systems of localism that reproduce
resource and residential segregation without using explicitly
racial rules.197 Indeed, much of what makes structural
inequality so persistent today is the unabashed hoarding of 
197. The fact that continuing institutionalized racial norms and customs are
active causes of inequality is not fatal to this argument about rules. “Rules” are
defined here as laws, which are clearly defined, albeit under-enforced; however,
as the Justice Department’s investigation of Ferguson, Missouri demonstrated,
norms and customs of administration in institutions (e.g. courts and law
enforcement) can bend those rules toward racial discrimination easily and
systematically. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 63 (2015) (inferring a relationship between historical bias in
Ferguson and the wielding of law enforcement discretion to the detriment of the
African American population).
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privileges that the holder regards as the product of merit
alone. On the other hand, fair housing was born in the time
of overt racial conflict over space where causation was—and
was legally required to be—a matter of clearly identifiable
policies with at least demonstrable racial impact. Finally, the
two theories are different in terms of the outcomes they seek.
Fair housing law seeks less discrimination and better
opportunity statistics institutionalized through residential
integration (“truly balanced living patterns”). Integration per 
se is not central to the goals of structural inequality theory.
Rather, this theory seeks lower disparities and better 
opportunity statistics resulting from fairer rules and more 
integrated resources.
The theory of structural inequality contains elements
common to fair housing and metropolitan equity. The
comparison reveals their potential for merger. Merging the
two will entail a different orientation toward the statutory 
scope and the nature of remedies available under the Act, as 
I discuss in Part III. Before doing so, it is important to
understand the gist of metropolitan equity studies as a
movement that emerged out of the civil rights impasse on
housing opportunity and the entrenchment of structural
inequality.
B. The Parallel Framework of Metropolitan Equity: A 
Primer in Context 
Metropolitan equity is the multidisciplinary analysis of
place-based structural inequality and disparate impacts,
combined with a normative push for change. The study and
advocacy of metropolitan equity (also called “regional
equity”) has coalesced since the early 1990s around a belief
that more and better information about regional inequities
can empower reform.198 This approach rigorously documents
198. See Xavier de Souza Briggs, Introduction to THE GEOGRAPHY OF
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1–2 (Xavier
de Souza Briggs ed., 2005).
   
    
   
    
     
     
    
  
     
   
   
      
    
     
 
    
    
     
       
   
      
      
 
      
   
     
  
 
           
    
         
     
       
       
         
      
    
        
 
792017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
disparities in “opportunity structures” across regions.
Regions are viewed as ecological wholes with interdependent 
parts. Scholar-activists like Manuel Pastor see the work in 
the social movement terms of more equitable economic
development policies pursued through political coalitions of
diverse regional constituencies.199 Analyses can be employed
as organizing tools against an identified threat to particular
poor and working-class communities. The threat may arise
from a crisis, but more often from the cumulative effects of
threatening trends, such as racial re-segregation. These
threats to social equity are recognized as a threat to
“sustainability” because the costs of regional inequalities can
no longer be contained in poorer areas, as burdens multiply
with population trends.
Thus, the quest for regional equity engages in
revitalizing inner-city and older suburban neighborhoods 
and urban markets as assets and key building blocks of a
healthy region. It reforms local, regional, and state policies
and practices in order to advance social and economic equity
within a region. And it links the needs of economically
isolated and racially segregated residents with the
opportunity structures throughout the region.200 
If federal fair housing law can be criticized as being too
individualized and atomistic, metropolitan equity research is 
the opposite—community focused, comprehensive, and full of
large numbers. It is an equitable framework that may, but
199. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Duncan, From Bootstrap Community Development
to Regional Equity, in BREAKTHROUGH COMMUNITIES: SUSTAINABILITY AND JUSTICE
IN THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS 11 (M. Paloma Pavel ed., 2009) [hereinafter
BREAKTHROUGH COMMUNITIES] (“A regional equity approach to development
combines community efforts to build strong institutions and better infrastructure
with regional policies to foster equitable public and private institutions.”);
MANUEL PASTOR, JR., CHRIS BRENNER & MARTHA MATSUOKA, THIS COULD BE THE
START OF SOMETHING BIG: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR REGIONAL EQUITY ARE 
RESHAPING METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2009).
200. M. PALOMA PAVEL, Introduction to BREAKTHROUGH COMMUNITIES, supra
note 199, at xxxv.
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often does not, lend itself to legal remedies for more systemic
litigation. More often, empirical case studies of regional
economic growth areas,201 such as trends in concentrated
poverty,202 the demographics of suburban migration and
fiscal decline,203 and recessionary effects on wealth204 have
influenced state and federal policy. Racial concentrations are
closely watched and often mapped.205 Graphic geographies of 
opportunity support research from myriad disciplines— 
history206, public health,207 sociology208 and social theory.209 
In contrast to the decidedly urban focus of earlier
201. See generally, e.g., CHRIS BRENNER & MANUEL PASTOR, JUST GROWTH:
INCLUSION AND PROSPERITY IN AMERICA’S METROPOLITAN REGIONS (2012).
202. Rima Wilkes & John Iceland, Hypersegregation in the Twenty-First
Century: An Update and Analysis, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 23, 23–24 (2004).
203. See generally MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW 
SUBURBAN REALITY (2002).
204. See generally THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING AFRICAN
AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 200 (2004).
205. See Equity Blog, POLICYLINK, http://www.policylink.org (last visited Oct.
24, 2016); Metropolitan Studies Program, BROOKINGS INST.,
http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/metro (last visited Oct. 24, 2016);
Program for Environmental and Regional Equity, UNIV. OF S. CAL., 
http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
206. See generally COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE FATE
OF THE AMERICAN CITY (2008); KEVIN MUMFORD, NEWARK: A HISTORY OF RACE,
RIGHTS, AND RIOTS IN AMERICA (2007); MELANIE SHELL-WEISS, COMING TO MIAMI:
A SOCIAL HISTORY (2009); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS:
RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (Princeton Univ. Press, 2005); THE
NEW SUBURBAN HISTORY (Kevin M. Kruse & Thomas J. Sugrue eds., 2006).
207. See generally, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Segregation and Stratification: A
Biosocial Perspective, 1 DU BOIS REV. 1 (2004) (positing causal links between
segregation and allostatic load among the concentrated poor).
208. See Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on
Intergenerational Mobility: Childhood Exposures & County-Level Estimates 1 
(2015), http://www.equality-of-opportunity.org/images/nbhds_exec_summary.pdf
(discussing place-based prospects for upward mobility in children). See also Raj
Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New
Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
(August 2015), http://equality-of-opportunity.org/images/mto_paper.pdf.
209. See generally RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL:
WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER 4–5 (2011).
   
    
      
    
   
    
 
 
     
    
  
   
     
    
  






     
   
        
    
    
 
            
      
         
       
 
          
    
           
           
        
      
 
812017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
scholarship,210 metropolitan equity research reflects a
relationship to the city, especially central cities, that ranges
from disinterested to indispensable, with a decided lean
toward emerging suburban dynamics. Demographic change
and the suburbanization of poverty has wrought a new
emphasis on the region.
However, if there are common threads to the diverse 
work in this field, they are these: i.) the use of a comparative
lens in looking at relative disadvantage; ii.) the conviction
that spatial dynamics are often responsible for persistent 
inequality; iii.) the expectation that residential organization
skews toward both racial and socioeconomic stratification
unless affirmatively redirected; and, iv.) the necessity of 
promoting fairness (specifically, equitable burdens and
benefits) as a principle of regional reform.211 Perhaps the 
biggest influence for metropolitan equity research so far has 
been its tacit inclusion in HUD’s Analysis of Impediments 
(AI) and more recent Assessment of Fair Housing (AFH) 
guidelines.212 However, its methodologies are common to 
disparate impact analyses.
Though metropolitan equity generally seeks to alter
unequal arrangements and is therefore remedial, its study
and advocacy have tended to lean away from traditional legal
remedies, even litigation (except for empirical accounts of 
disparate impact). This tendency reflects several factors,
210. See generally PETER MARRIS & MARTIN REIN, DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL
REFORM: POVERTY AND COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1982);
JOHN H. MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY 6–7 (1983); see also, Sherry R.
Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 216, 216– 
18 (1969).
211. See generally DAVID DANTE TROUTT, THE PRICE OF PARADISE: THE COSTS
OF INEQUALITY AND A VISION FOR A MORE EQUITABLE AMERICA (2013).
212. For instance, the HUD Assessment Tool was issued in connection with
the final rule on affirmatively furthering fair housing and serves as a template
for preparing the required Analysis of Fair Housing. See Fair Housing
Assessment Tool, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/ 
publications/pdf/AFFH-Assessment-Tool-2014.pdf.
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including disillusionment with federal law and the failures
of civil rights statutes as tools for structural change, the high
costs of litigation, and internal criticisms of the “regnant,” or
elitist, distancing of litigators from their civil rights clients.
Surprisingly, legal scholarship has been ambivalent to
embrace its claims.213 Thus, metropolitan equity advocacy
has stood parallel the law, referencing it for the purpose of 
critique but finding little of use in it for achieving results on
the ground. This, I argue, partly reflects a need to imagine a
greater potential scope of the FHA.
Nevertheless, the goal of metropolitan equity studies is
to facilitate a regional framework of remediation that can
overcome structural inequality. If we look back to the theory
of structural inequality factors set forth earlier in this Part,
we see that most are identical to the research design of 
metropolitan equity: the interest in opportunity access for
213. Since regional equity analyses surfaced in the academic literature in
about the late 1990s, mainstream legal scholarship has focused less on its
equitable dimensions. Most local government law scholars tended to ignore
metropolitan equity or associated it with something called “the New
Regionalism,” the latter inviting lengthy dismissals about the effectiveness (or
the political likelihood) of metropolitan government, intergovernmental
cooperation, and consolidation. These writers often concluded, with some
analytical force, that regionalism will not work. Somehow this seemed to become
the dominant discourse on metropolitan equity in local government law, though
its normative aims were thinly defined and its focus on equity fleeting. See, e.g.,
DAVID L. KIRK ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SURBUBIA
(1995); NEAL R. PEIRCE, HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE
WORLD (1993); Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity
Strategies, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y. REV. 11 (1997); Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional
Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002); Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization
and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190 (2001); Laurie Reynolds,
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 
78 WASH. L. REV. 93 (2003); Edward A. Zelinsky, Metropolitanism, Progressivism 
& Race, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (1998) (reviewing DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT
SUBURBS (1993)). More hopeful about the equity-enhancing potential of more
centralized governmental solutions include Bollens, supra; Paul Boudreaux, E 
Pluribus Unum Urbs: An Exploration of the Potential Benefits of Metropolitan 
Government on Efforts to Assist Poor Persons, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. (1998);
Robert H. Frelich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. L. 183 
(1997); Georgette C. Poindexter, Beyond the Urban-Suburban Dichotomy: A
Discussion of Sub-Regional Poverty Concentration, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 67 (2000).
   
     
    
     
    
   
    
 
   
   
   
  
    
     
  
    
 
    
   
   
     
   
    
 
     
    
     
  
     
   
     
     
 
       
832017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
communities (as a proxy for individuals), the primacy of 
comparative geography on a regional scale, quantification of
the disparities in institutional resources (mostly housing
policy) and interrogation of the rules that reproduce 
disparities, and the guiding use of fairness as the relevant 
standard. It is the outcomes that are less clear. What specific
outcomes does metropolitan equity seek?
So far, the list of remedies has been limited. Most efforts 
tie back to an interest in inducing greater racial and
economic residential integration. Desegregating the
metropolitan area is implicitly viewed as the means to open 
pathways to greater institutional resources, like stronger 
schools and the improved services that come with more
robust tax bases. This inclusive character of equity is evident
in efforts to spread the availability of housing vouchers into 
the growth centers of suburbia, or to push for fair share
affordable housing arrangements in more states. The fact 
that demography is rapidly shifting in favor of non-whites 
across most of metropolitan America supports policies that
recognize the interdependency of places and thus, sharing in 
costs and growth more equitably. Clearly, the metropolitan
equity approach can expand to as many institutional
practices as affect inequality of opportunity. But will it join
fair housing law?
This compact summary of a broad field not only
demonstrates clear links to the theory of structural
inequality earlier in this Part, but also to the express goals 
of the FHA. This, I believe, is causal. While the Act has had
extraordinarily limited success in achieving its goals, that
record of failure and its consequences have been closely
tracked by researchers committed to their revival. Much of
that work can be collapsed into housing policy “directed to
affirmatively connect affordable housing to neighborhoods of 
opportunity, whether they are in a revitalized inner city or
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in an affluent suburb.”214 This is anti-ghettoization redux.
Thus, metropolitan equity scholars have studied the benefits
of Gautreaux-inspired mobility programs. Philanthropic
organizations have long pledged to support the work of 
housing equality that litigation could not bring about. And
the research methodology associated with spatial inequality
has indeed supported the disparate impact evidence brought 
in cases such as ICP and others. It is capable of more.
C.  The Respective Roles of Race and Integration 
Two questions remain for this Part: What is the role of 
race in remedying structural inequality through fair
housing? And, what is the particular role of integration? My
answer is that we go where empirical reality takes us, which
happens to be consistent with the sometimes outdated terms 
of the Act. Integration has a more mixed relevance, but its 
usefulness as a remedy, I suggest, requires an updated
definition consistent with the Act’s original goals.
Although the subject of race and racism is treated with
color-blind, even “color-scared,” ambivalence in many official
accounts of inequality, federal fair housing law continues
appropriately to center race and racism by its very terms.
Under the Act, few burdens of access to opportunity are
cognizable without pleading a racial injury. This is an
overlooked benefit of the FHA, because it comports with
empirical realities. Metropolitan equity analyses of unequal
regions demonstrate the persistent significance of race as the 
most common factor alongside income in determining access
to strong institutions. National statistics on discrete aspects 
of economic condition and democratic participation are 
routinely characterized by a racial divide—in
214. John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair
Housing Act at 40, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 617 (2008).
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unemployment,215 foreclosure rates,216 incarceration,217 
voting access,218 etc. As Justice Kennedy observed in ICP, we
are duty bound in the housing context to recognize the 
continued centrality of race and racism.
Conversely, the failure to recognize race in the fair
housing context can lead to persistent racial segregation
despite significant efforts to the contrary. New Jersey’s Mt. 
Laurel doctrine provides a singular fair housing example of
what happens when income is deliberately substituted for
race. Almost nothing in the “fair share” doctrine announced
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1975 focuses on 
remedying the segregative effects of exclusionary land use
policies. The court nodded to racial exclusion in a case
215. Irrespective of the universal fluctuations in joblessness, Black Americans
are consistently unemployed at twice the rate of White Americans.
Unemployment Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 2010, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
(Oct. 5, 2014), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20111005.htm. See also
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpsee_e16.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2016).
216. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the
American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 635 (2010) (analyzing
independently collected data and concluding that seventy-seven percent of
foreclosures between 2006 and 2008 occurred in metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) wherein seventy-five percent or more of the nation’s African American,
“Hispanic,” and Asian populations reside).
217. Data from June 30, 2010, estimated that the Black incarceration
population in all federal, state, and local jails and prisons was 4347 males and
260 females per 100,000, as compared to 678 white males and 91 white females.
LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CORRECTION POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 8 (2010) (identifying that the same study found 1775 Latino males and
133 Latino females were incarcerated per 100,000).
218. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTIONS: ISSUES RELATED TO 
VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS, GAO-14-634, at 25 (2015) (analyzing the impact of
identification requirements at voting locations and noting that approximately
twenty percent of African Americans nationwide may lack a driver’s license and
seventy percent are without a passport, with the numbers of individuals holding
valid, non-expired identification being even lower). Civic engagement by Black
Americans is diminished due to numerous restrictions. Disenfranchisement of
incarcerated and formerly incarcerated persons disproportionately bars
minorities from the right to vote.
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brought by that town’s NAACP, but included many other
categories of prospective residents priced out by restrictive
zoning ordinances.219 A “fair share” legal architecture was
born, aided by “Mt. Laurel courts” designed to hear builders’
remedies cases and eventually codified in the state’s 1985
Fair Housing Act.220 New Jersey’s notion of fair housing was
not premised on a requirement of racial inclusion. Today, the
regulatory apparatus that began with the establishment of
the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) compels 
municipalities to certify compliance with a complex formula
(still contested) of affordable housing creation—but without
regard to race.221 
The result, in short, has been a numbers game of highly
specialized lawyers, planners, and consultants trying to
prove compliance—but very little racial integration. Indeed,
David Rusk and I studied fourteen northern New Jersey 
counties in order to determine the current distribution of
racially mixed census tracts.222 The results were consistent
219. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d 713, 717 (N.J.
1975) (“Plaintiffs represent the minority group poor (black and Hispanic) seeking
such quarters. But they are not the only category of persons barred from so many
municipalities by reason of restrictive land use regulations. We have reference to
young and elderly couples, single persons and large, growing families not in the
poverty class, but who still cannot afford the only kinds of housing realistically
permitted in most places—relatively high-priced, single-family detached
dwellings on sizeable lots and, in some municipalities, expensive apartments.”)
(citation omitted).
220. S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456 A.2d 390, 420, 452– 
53 (N.J. 1983) (explaining the “fair share” obligation and the need for availability
of a builder’s remedy unless sound environmental or planning concerns provide
sound reason for a denial). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-302 (West 2016)
(highlighting the centrality of the Mount Laurel decisions to the creation of New
Jersey’s Fair Housing Act).
221. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 110 A.3d 31, 42, 51 (N.J. 2015)
(addressing COAH’s blatant failure to function as the FHA intended and
reinstating the courts as the “forum of first resort” for all matters concerning
obligations under the Mount Laurel decisions).
222. David Rusk & David D. Troutt, Diverse & Inclusive, Moderate-Income
Municipalities (DIMIs): Elusive Stability in Northern New Jersey Suburbs, 
(2015) (on file with the author).
   
    
     
     
     
    
        
    
    
    
   
  
     
   
   
      
     
     
    
    




   
     
 
 
       
        
          
    
        
     
        
           




with other findings about a lack of racial penetration by
blacks and Latinos in New Jersey.223 We showed that only
among municipalities that fall well below the median state
income level does one find census tracts that have at least a
ten percent population of blacks, Latinos, and whites.
(Asians tended heavily to live among whites.) As one moves
further up the income scale to the median and beyond, only
a handful of communities could meet this minimal measure 
of racial diversity notwithstanding their record of building
Mt. Laurel housing. It appears that the wealthier the 
community, the more successful it was at minimizing its fair
share obligation entirely or satisfying it with housing
occupied by low- and moderate-income whites.224 
Thus, the continued salience of racial disadvantage
coupled with the express racial protections of the federal Fair
Housing Act would seem to lead inexorably toward racial
integration as the primary remedy for large-scale denials of
opportunity access and a legislative interest in anti-
segregation. But the public and academic discourse is 
suspicious of integration. Dominant narratives ignore it.
African American writers in particular have sounded
skeptical, if not disinterested, in integration for decades. 
John Calmore, one of the most thoughtful and prolific 
housing scholars, wrote off the prospect of integrating low-
income blacks, and listed several reasons why middle-class
blacks were hesitant to seek white neighborhoods.
223. TOGETHER NORTH JERSEY, supra note 163.
224. Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of Social
Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851–52 (2011); see
Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: 
An Analysis of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1268, 1302–05 (1997) (discussing data findings that affordable housing
applicant success is skewed in favor of white, elderly applicants); see also N.J.
Council on Affordable Hous., Substantive Rules of the New Jersey Council on
Affordable Housing, 46 N.J. Reg 924(a), 1011–36 (proposed June 2, 2014),
http://www.nj.gov/dca/services/lps/hss/statsandregs/599_for_web.pdf (note, only
for data relating to unmet affordable housing obligations).
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First, there is a desire to link residence with a sense of community
that is missing within the context of predominantly white places, 
particularly white suburban neighborhoods. Second, there is a 
profound integration fatigue that is compounded by the alienation
and distrust of whites that is associated with the black experience
of having “integrated” dominant institutions and parts of society.
Finally, the heavy burdens of having to personify “the acceptable
Negro” and assimilated token in order to succeed on mainstream 
terms is taking its toll, a sociological burden I have likened to that
of “passing” biologically as white. In short, the quest for material
benefits through integration is in acute tension with being able to
find within integration a sense of belonging that is enhanced by the
accoutrements of dignity, respect, and acceptance.225 
Since then, others have taken at best a utilitarian
approach to integration—a necessary step in the sharing of
resources but not one to take enthusiastically.226 
On the other hand, both the continued resistance to and
demand for housing choice vouchers in predominantly white,
high-opportunity areas suggests that the market for
integration may be greater than the discourse suggests.227 It
225. John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at
Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1108 (1998).
226. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM, at xiii (2004) (“There is much
evidence of an emerging ‘post-civil rights’ attitude among black folks. We are
ambivalent integrationists.”); John A. Powell, The Tensions Between Integration 
and School Reform, 28 HASTINGS L.Q. 655, 682 (2001).
227. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 65 (2013)
(highlighting the Mount Laurel case study of the Ethel R. Lawrence subdivision
and its demonstration that introduction of affordable housing into a higher-
income neighborhood does not increase crime or lower property values); David P.
Varady et al., How Housing Professionals Perceive Effects of the Housing Choice
Voucher Program on Suburban Communities, 15(3) CITYSCAPE: J. POLICY DEV. &
RESEARCH 105, 108–09 (2013), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/ 
cityscpe/vol15num3/ch5.pdf (attributing resistance to HCV to underlying
racism); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS FACT
SHEET, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_ 
indian_housing/programs/hcv/about/fact_sheet (last visited Jan. 15, 2017)
(noting the “long waiting periods” associated with HCVs and informing that a
public housing agency may close waiting lists when unlikely that new families
   
  
      
 




     
   
    
    
    
    
   
     
    
   
    
      
    
      
      
 
  
     
  
   
  
  
   
   
 
         
      
     
  
892017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
is difficult to know exactly what people think, but application
rates and waiting lists indicate that a great many people
currently living in low-opportunity, segregated communities
would willingly exploit opportunities to integrate into
higher-resource environments if given the chance.
Yet the larger problem with integration is the failure to
define it in relevant contemporary terms that includes the
relevant interests of the past. Recall that in the national and
legislative discussions leading to passage of the Act, the 
interests in anti-discrimination and anti-segregation were
cast in a dichotomous spatial terminology that seemed
unchangeable: ghetto and suburb. These freighted terms 
carried many implied binaries, such as black-white and poor-
middle class. However, there was underlying interest in
access to opportunity that should not expire with the disuse 
of that language. Today, the suburb is not one type of suburb.
The ghetto is not only a swath of the inner city. Neighborhood
revitalization is often gentrification one step removed.
Residential integration is often only as stable as the
proverbial snap-shot. Our spatial vernacular for opportunity
has changed a lot since 1968. Yet structural inequality
theory accounts for the linguistic differences. It clarifies how
appropriately modified remedies may be consistent with the
Act’s interest in access to opportunity.
The re-definition of integration under structural
inequality theory begins with the Act’s primary focus upon 
residency. Housing is important because, as fundamental
shelter from contingency, it represents locational
determinism in a market economy. What both prongs of the 
FHA require, therefore, is the integration of institutional
resources (including revenues) that are derived locally from
housing and housing-related services. Fairness is not simply
can be assisted “in the near future”); FURMAN CTR. & MOELIS INST., INVESTIGATING
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOUSING VOUCHER USE AND CRIME 2 (2013),
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/FurmanCenter-HousingVoucherUse 
Crime.pdf (acknowledging community resistance to HCVs and debunking
perceptions of a correlation between vouchers and increases in local crime).
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a matter of free housing choice; if it were, § 3608 and the
AFFH requirement would be erroneous. Fairness concerns 
the distribution of those resources we expect to flow from
housing choice. As the anti-segregation features of the Act 
show, this distribution of resources should be measured
across a regional scope. The integration of resources into 
lower-income neighborhoods and municipalities would
derive from challenging the inequitable rules and norms 
(and funding levels) operating in any institution that is
responsible for some aspect of opportunity access. 
Metropolitan equity studies help to fill in what these
institutions are—transportation planning and spending 
priorities, infrastructure development, education finance
and others. However, housing is always the anchor. 
Opportunity is cultivated in individuals as they pass through
these critical institutions and exploit the resources within
them. Yet the path to those institutions—and which ones are 
accessible—naturally begins and ends at home. This will
sometimes call for the most direct route to integrated
resources, racially integrated neighborhoods. But to end
there is an oversimplification of the term and a disservice to
the purpose of fair housing. People need to get to resources 
or resources need to get to them. Thus, in contemporary fair
housing law, integration must mean connecting housing-
related resources to residency without limitation by race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or
disability.
D.  Conclusion 
This Part posited a theory of structural inequality with
features common to both fair housing law and metropolitan
equity study and advocacy. Linked by a critique of localism
and its excesses in expanding inequality and segregation, the
theory identified common interests in opportunity access, a
regional focus and outcomes subject to a fairness standard. 
The differences are important, too, including the measures of 
inequality and the outcomes sought, especially integration.
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However, metropolitan equity studies clearly show the
importance of seeing integration in a multi-dimensional way
by focusing on resource integration rather than simply
residential integration. The analysis has also shown that
metropolitan equity, a field that grew up partly out of
frustration with fair housing law, has a lot of fair housing in
it. The question we take up in the final Part is whether fair
housing is fundamentally metropolitan equity.
III. FAIR HOUSING AS METROPOLITAN EQUITY 
The analysis so far has shown that metropolitan equity
is fair housing. Its emphasis on inclusion without
discrimination and the equitable integration of resources
within residential environments is fully consistent with the
aims of fair housing. The remaining question is whether fair
housing can be metropolitan equity. If it were, it would mean
that the FHA could address a broader number of systemic,
housing-related ills of structural inequality.228 This
enhancement of statutory scope should be possible, I argued
in the last Part, given the theoretical bridge that structural
inequality extends between systemic fair housing litigation
on one side and metropolitan equity on the other. That theory
directs us to look at regional disparities in the institutional
resources available in different municipalities, to compare 
rules and norms against an equity standard, and to seek 
remedies that promote the sharing of benefits and burdens
across often segregated regions. Metropolitan equity gets us
toward a clearer understanding of the forces sustaining
inequality, but it is admittedly short on workable remedies.
Fair housing litigation, were it to cover more of the subjects
studied by metropolitan equity, could offer the push. The 
228. The idea of expanding coverage into many aspects of the overall housing
market has a long pedigree. Applying Title VIII to racially restrictive covenants,
Judge Wilkey wrote in his concurrence that “Congress was aware that the
measure would have a very broad reach, and indeed the legislation was seen as
an attempt to alter the whole character of the housing market.” Mayers v. Ridley,
465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wilkey, J., concurring).
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question is what would such a merger entail.
The answer depends upon the seriousness with which
courts will consider the Act’s anti-segregation/anti-
ghettoization purpose. If courts interpret segregation in the
narrow residential binaries of 1968, merger will be difficult.
If courts see segregation as the housing linchpin to broader
institutional denials of access, expansion is more likely.
Metropolitan equity asks which institutional rules are
susceptible to equity-based scrutiny under Title VIII. For a
merger of metropolitan equity and fair housing to occur, 
inequity must be cognizable under the Act. If it is, we should
be able to look at some of the key institutional arbiters of
opportunity across a relevant region, subject their rules and
norms to equitable examination against the goal of reducing 
the inequality of opportunity that segregation reproduces— 
racial concentration, under-resourced institutions, and high
poverty rates. Thus, the statutory scope expansion relevant
here involves three steps: 
1. recognizing equity as a legal norm under Title VIII;
2. extending the reach of the statute’s subject matter
beyond housing to related residential functions and
institutions; and,
3. allowing liability not only for discrimination but for
the failure to affirmatively ameliorate the racially
disparate effects of continuing segregation.
Before engaging in a hypothetical exercise about what
this merger would look like, let’s acknowledge what would be
the easiest route to more egalitarian, stronger, and more
inclusive regions: an active administrative enforcement 
regime led by HUD. If HUD used its authority under AFFH 
more aggressively, it could significantly reduce the need for
litigation. That is, if HUD put in place a searching and
consequential certification process by which recipients of its
funds knew that non-compliance would terminate aid, the
incentives for promoting more resource-rich communities
would be very effective in speeding change. Alternatively, if
   
       
   
    
       
   
  
  
      
 
  
      
      
    
  
     
  
   
    
     
   
  
       
      
   
 
           
      
 
      
       
     
     
      
      
   
         




Congress were to amend § 3608 and provide a private right
of action for litigants to sue recipients for failure to 
Affirmatively Further Fair Housing, a new set of 
ameliorative norms might set in among local and state
governments.229 These are both unlikely, but are
placeholders in the background of what follows.
Nevertheless, each of the hypotheticals described next as 
well as the legal goals and precedents outlined could
conceivably be attached to an AFFH claim.
The remainder of this Part builds toward three 
hypothetical lawsuits. I begin with a statement of goals for
systemic fair housing litigation. Next, I set forth the kind of
legal precedents I believe that fair housing advocates
practicing metropolitan equity should seek from courts. 
Third, I lay out for clarity some of the basic statutory
provisions one might use, as well as some indication of
appropriate plaintiffs and defendants. Fourth, I examine
hypothetical controversies in transportation equity and two
in property tax fairness—tax-base sharing and inter-district 
educational choice. I conclude with a note on other
approaches. For the sake of argument, I deliberately omit
discussing the companion causes of action any litigator
would ordinarily bring. I disclaim any attempt to draw up a
one-size-fits-all litigation manual. The point, rather, is to
stimulate another direction in a discourse on Title VIII that,
229. This was in fact proposed by the National Commission on Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity during the notice period. Specifically, the Commission
sought:
[a]n amendment to the Fair Housing Act—defining a discriminatory
housing practice to include a violation of the affirmatively furthering
provision—would provide several direct remedies including an
administrative complaint, an express private right of action in federal or
state court, and an authorization for action by the U.S. Department of
Justice if the violation amounted to a pattern and practice of
discrimination or a matter of general public importance.
NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR
HOUSING: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY (2008), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/fairhousing/ 
emerging.html.
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after almost fifty years, could use a fresh take.
A.  The Goals of Systemic Fair Housing Litigation 
Earlier I noted that systemic litigation has both 
productive and disruptive functions. Like the two key 
purposes of the Act (anti-discrimination and anti-
segregation), this type of litigation seeks both to produce 
significantly greater access to the institutions responsible for
conferring opportunities and to disrupt a range of
institutional practices that exclude protected groups from 
opportunity. These two functions frame the fundamental
goals of lawsuits. First, systemic case theories have to seek a
deconcentration of poverty in the region’s poorest places. 
Nothing delimits opportunity like concentrated poverty. 
Poverty’s costs are first internalized by the poor, then spread
to the rest of us through lost contributions and higher taxes.
Poverty deconcentration is a productive function. The
corresponding disruptive function is to make the hoarding of 
privilege very expensive for those communities that engage
in it. Systemic litigation should disrupt the benefits of
privilege hoarding by increasing the costs of exclusion.
A second goal of systemic fair housing litigation is to
promote constructive interdependency among regional
actors. This is a productive function. Inter-local competition
is costly and inefficient, an engine of segregation and a
purveyor of stratification while ignoring the larger
interdependencies shared by municipalities in a region.
Metropolitan equity scholars (and other students of
inequality) consistently demonstrate that widening
inequality is bad for outcomes across entire regions.
Litigation that promotes interdependency and shared
decision-making over institutional behavior has the added
benefit of disrupting zero-sum parochialism.
Third, whenever possible, a goal of systemic fair housing
litigation as metropolitan equity should be to foster the
grounds for future inclusiveness. This is more a question of
building an ethos in which both the public and their local
   
    
    
  
    
   
     
   
 
     
 
    
   
    
    
     
       
 
   
    
    
      
    
 
  
     
     
 
    
    
 
            
      
      
        
 
952017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
officials see inclusion as an imperative of changing times.
One of the signature problems for Title VIII over the decades 
has been the failure to disrupt the fundamental notion of the
antagonistic “Other”—the wrong town, the wrong
neighborhood, the wrong people, all worthy of avoidance. It
is an irony of our adversarial process but probably true
nonetheless: litigation over the terms of community should
seek ultimately to nurture a sense of community.
B.  Legal Precedents Sought 
There are a number of precedents that fair housing
litigation might set, guaranteeing the expansion of the Act’s 
scope on the way to achieving greater metropolitan equity.
The first is that housing is at the hub of many related services
whose dependence is so substantial that activity affecting 
them is commonly considered “housing-related” under the
Act. As we will see shortly, transportation policy is
inextricably connected to housing as is education and any
fiscal policy that is dependent on the property tax system.
A key precedent aimed at reversing tax base disparities 
is that, in racially impacted markets, systems of fiscal
capacity that depend upon local property tax assessments
may discriminate by race in rendering unequal the provision
of services in connection with housing. Metropolitan equity
studies demonstrate that property tax-dependent systems 
typically drive inequalities that become even more
pronounced in areas of racial impact.230 This can be tied to
the process of racial segregation and its resulting economic
costs.
There are several helpful education-related precedents
that flow from the relationship between schools and housing.
230. See, e.g., CHRIS BRENNER & MANUEL PASTOR, JUST GROWTH: INCLUSION
AND PROSPERITY IN AMERICA’S METROPOLITAN REGIONS 2 (2012) (citing studies to
show the correlation between growing regional inequality and slower growth);
MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 49, 51– 
53 (2002).
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First, weak schools constrict housing choice and vice versa.
This results from a causal chain in which a court could
recognize that policies that diminish housing choice lead to
racially segregated school districts, which in turn are
primary causes of weak schools. A related precedent that
may arise from a separate cause of action is this: stable
neighbors and middle-class classmates are educational 
resources. Educators have long understood that
neighborhood composition affects classroom composition,
and the latter is predictive of educational outcomes. Courts 
should follow suit.231 
C.  Applicable Provisions and Actors 
Although there are multiple provisions of the Act that
may be mined for systemic case theories, I focus here on two 
discussed earlier, § 804(a) and (b), as well as the AFFH
clauses in § 808. Prospective theories might be constrained
by courts barring post-acquisition claims, an unsettled area
of law.232 Here, the theories rely on asserting constructive 
denials of opportunity under 804(a) and discrimination in
“the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith” under § 804(b) (emphasis added).
D.  Three Hypothetical Lawsuits 
In the following exercise, I examine how these fair
housing expansions into metropolitan equity might work in
the context of three hypothetical illustrations. All of these
examples mitigate some of the harshest effects of localism.
231. Although I have tried here to frame this discussion away from more
traditional racial integration remedies, one precedent flows from the last:
Housing that is intended for families must be integrated because schools must be
integrated in order to afford all students the greatest chance for a free and
appropriate education.
232. See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005) (post-
acquisition habitability not cognizable under § 3604(b)); Halprin v. Prairie Single
Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004).
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None of them actually require residential integration,
though all rely factually on segregated patterns of residential
organization. First is transportation spending disparities
that result in inadequate transportation alternatives for
lower-income, disproportionately minority residents of many
regions. The lack of reasonable transportation alternatives
disconnects them from areas of jobs and economic growth.
Second is metropolitan tax-base sharing, a legislative rule
change that Title VIII plaintiffs might seek against an
inequitable system of property tax revenues that
consistently favor some municipalities in a region over
others. The resulting fiscal and services inequalities
disproportionately impact minorities. The context for the 
hypothetical involves the spoils of publicly-funded stadium 
development. Finally, to reach the situation in St. Louis
County that I described in the Introduction, I offer inter-
district educational choice as a fair housing claim. I narrow
the hypothetical context of this complex field to districts
under prolonged state takeovers.
What if a predominantly minority suburb was bypassed
for a commuter train station after a combination of state
actors decided to invest billions in the expansion of an
existing rail link into the central city? Putting aside any
other claims it might have under applicable transportation
and administrative laws, does the municipality have a cause
of action under the FHA? From a metropolitan equity
standpoint, the example illustrates transportation inequities
in services and public spending that tend to compound the 
jobs-housing mismatch for workers who disproportionately
need affordable mass transit options.233 Connecting people to 
233. For studies on transportation equity, see Yinglin Fan et al., Impact of
Light Rail Implementation on Labor Market Accessibility: A Transportation 
Equity Perspective, 5 J. TRANSPORT & LAND USE 1, 1–2 (2010); Transportation
Equity Atlas, PRATT CENTER FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
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jobs up and down the commuter corridor, from the interior
(inner-ring suburbs) to the exterior (outer-ring suburban job
centers), without demanding they pay disproportionately for
car travel (car initial cost, maintenance, insurance, tolls) or
public transit commuting time (the routes currently take
longer because their municipality is on no direct line) is a key
goal of elected officials of working-class towns and their
constituents. For these commuters, adequate, affordable
public transportation is a lifeline to economic opportunity. A
policy that excludes them from the benefits of public
spending on transportation in favor of wealthier, more
politically connected towns would appear to continue a
regional trend of winners and losers. Yet a feature of localism
is that towns outside the decision-making jurisdictions have
little to no say over activities beyond their boundaries.
The plaintiff’s claim would be for discrimination under
§ 3604(b) and (a)234 under a theory that the transportation 
initiative discriminates against the minority town and its
residents in the conditions and privileges of tenancy “or in
the provision of services or facilities in connection” with
housing, resulting in a denial of the benefits of non-
segregated housing opportunity.235 The claim recalls the
theory of opportunity denial in Thompson v. HUD discussed
http://prattcenter.net/projects/transportation-equity/transportation-equity-atlas
(last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (showing large disparities in commute times between
minorities and whites among New York City’s five boroughs).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) makes it unlawful “[t]o discriminate against any
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in
the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” The city would also have
grounds to sue HUD directly for violating its duty to affirmatively further fair
housing in the administration of its programs, which explicitly include
transportation. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012). The city might also assert a § 3604(a) denial
of housing opportunity available in the towns receiving the new stations on the
grounds that the corresponding higher real estate prices associated with transit-
oriented development will have a disparate impact on lower-income minority
residents of the bypassed town.
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earlier.236 The legal issues are many, but I will focus on just
two: whether the municipality has standing and whether the 
government’s action under its transportation authority
violates fair housing interests.
As to standing, the Eleventh Circuit recently articulated
an expansive concept of FHA standing in City of Miami v.
Bank of America.237 Alleging violations of §§ 3604(b) and
3605(a),238 the city sued the bank for years of predatory
lending in minority neighborhoods, racial discrimination in
the form of redlining and reverse redlining that resulted in
much higher rates of foreclosure for those homeowners.239 In 
a suit for damages, the city asserted a municipal interest in
the loss of expected property tax revenues (because
foreclosures lower surrounding property values, thus
reducing tax assessments) as well as the actual costs of
additional city services (because foreclosures attract crime
and require upkeep normally paid for by owners).240 Lending
discrimination, the city alleged, had eroded property values
and hurt the tax base, bringing financial injury to the city.241 
The circuit court reversed the trial court, holding it “clear as
a bell” that standing under the FHA is as broad as Article III
standing will bear.242 The city would succeed even under
stricter “zone of interests” tests of standing, given the
236. 348 F. Supp. 398 (D. Md. 2005); see discussion supra Section I.B.1.
237. 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015).
238. “It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business
includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate
against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or
conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a). A “residential real estate-
related transaction” includes “the making or purchasing of loans . . . for
purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling; or
secured by residential real estate.” Id. § 3605(b)(1).
239. City of Miami, 800 F.3d at 1267–68.
240. Id. at 1269.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1277.
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contextual nature of injuries in fair housing cases.243 
The transportation equity hypothetical contains several
features similar to City of Miami. Like that case, this one
shows a city asserting its own interest in not internalizing
the costs of policies that have segregative effects (the racial
interest) with corresponding financial injury (the economic
interest). Not only would transportation development 
bypassing the minority town further racially segregated
residential patterns, but it would favor predominantly white
towns over minority towns in the distribution of government
benefits. The proof of racial injury would be shown
empirically with the kind of disparate impact transportation 
data common to metropolitan equity analyses.244 One could
argue that two aspects of this argument remain unsettled.
The first is whether our hypothetical plaintiff-municipality
could survive the defense that its injury is too indirect, an
element of proximate causation. The other is whether a court 
would dismiss the action as one seeking post-acquisition (as
opposed to pre-transactional) housing-related injuries, a
distinction made by at least one circuit court.245 However, the 
town could also argue that it suffers if future residents will
be dissuaded from seeking housing in a transportation-
isolated market.
This last point reaches the second major hurdle for the 
243. The Eleventh Circuit’s City of Miami opinion recognized an alternative— 
but in its view inapplicable—analysis of standing by the Supreme Court in a
recent Lanham Act case, Lexmark v. Static Control Components, Inc., in which
the Court said that the zone of interests test should be controlled by “traditional
tools of statutory interpretation.” 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1386–87 (2014). Even by that
standard, the city’s interest in non-segregated, “truly balanced living patterns”
would suffice.
244. As a practical matter, hypothetical plaintiffs might want to demonstrate
some unsuccessful attempt to find affordable housing in the towns targeted for
transportation subsidies. See Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1975).
245. See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 2005). But see Comm. 
Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 713–15 (9th
Cir. 2009) (concerning sewer services).
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hypothetical plaintiff: How is transportation policy housing
policy under the Act? Here is where the true statutory
expansion occurs, with the aid of metropolitan equity
analyses. Transportation is already mentioned in § 808 as a
linked activity with housing, and transportation
considerations are among the planning factors required by
the Assessment of Fair Housing.246 What we would expect a
regional analysis of housing markets to add is that mass
transit, transportation spending, and transit-oriented
development are governmental expenditures inextricably
connected to housing policy and planning. It is hard to 
separate the two, especially outside of central cities. This
relationship will become even more important amid climate
concerns where commuters are sensitive not only about
increasing congestion and commuting times but also about
over-dependence on fossil fuels. The fair housing argument
is that these concerns are even more pressing for lower-
income minority workers living in segregated municipalities,
since for them environmental concerns mix with concerns
about employment access and wealth maximization
(property value) to limit opportunity.
Sharing the tax gains of localized development across all
of a region’s municipalities has long been a goal of many
metropolitan equity scholars who write in the legislative 
vein.247 Only a few states such as Minnesota have such a
statutory mechanism.248 Since the idea arises out of a need
to trim the excesses of localism on behalf of poorer cities and
246. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d). See discussion supra Section II.D.1.
247. See generally, Myron Orfield & Nicholas Wallace, The Minnesota Fiscal 
Disparities Act of 1971: The Twin Cities Struggle and Blueprint for Regional
Cooperation, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 591 (2007).
248. Charles R. Weaver Metropolitan Revenue Distribution Act, Minn. Stat.
Ann. §§ 473F.01–08 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (“The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities
Act”).
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towns whose disproportionately minority populations suffer
a disparate impact to their tax base when they lose out on
economic growth to more attractive neighbors, it is worth
considering whether it could pass muster under the FHA.
What if a new sports and entertainment stadium/arena was 
proposed by state and private actors to be built in a suburb
of a large metropolitan area using state redevelopment
funds? Municipalities just beyond the benefits boundary sue 
under the FHA to demand tax-base sharing as a remedy.
From the standpoint of poorer plaintiff municipalities,
this action represents a clear instance in which structural
inequality theory bridges the gap between metropolitan
equity and fair housing. The economic benefits created by a
publicly financed arena represents regional opportunity
denied by an exclusionary governmental policy.249 The 
redevelopment policy is the product of several important
institutions—taxing authorities, state agencies, local
planning boards, special commissions, public-private
partnerships—whose rules and norms around stadium
development deals are facially neutral but bring decidedly
unequal resources to some communities in the region and not
others. The have-nots in this hypothetical competition for tax
revenues are, in HUD parlance, disproportionately “low-
opportunity, racially impacted” municipalities, leading to
proof of disparate impact.250 Let’s assume that the real estate
nature of the transactions at issue minimize any subject
matter concerns about whether the conflict fits within the
Act’s scope. Rather, the more pressing legal issue is whether
municipalities alleging harm from the stadium deal have
grounds to demand reform of the state’s tax policy. After all,
249. For a thoughtful account of some of the negative ripple effects of stadium
developments on minority communities historically, see Daniel Judt, Stadiums
Ruin Neighborhoods, THE NATION (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/ 
article/stadiums-ruin-neighborhoods/.
250. It is well settled that HUD is obligated to evaluate the effects of
development on racial minorities living in surrounding areas. Pleune v. Pierce,
765 F. Supp. 43, 47–48 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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in this example it’s the lop-sided tax implications of the
proposal that give rise to the municipal harms.
Although the claim’s success is unlikely, the reasons are 
instructive. Like the previous example, each plaintiff town
here would argue that a policy that discriminates against its
tax base in residential transactions disproportionately
impacts minority access to opportunity in violation of the
Act. But each plaintiff could not claim that the Act entitled
it to a right to equal economic benefits from a regional
development deal. In other words, the standard sought here 
by plaintiffs is equity, not equality, of housing-related
benefits. Since there is no FHA precedent (yet) for claims of 
discriminatory denial of benefits among regional actors, 
court-ordered tax base sharing as a remedy for the 
inequitable distribution of regional development benefits 
and burdens would have systemic impact. Thus, the primary
legal challenge for systemic litigation of this kind is getting
judicial recognition of an equity standard under Title VIII.
A common metropolitan equity assertion is that “housing
policy is education policy,” because residency determines
district membership in much of the United States. This
hypothetical asks whether education policy can also be
housing policy under the FHA. Compelling inter-district
choice through housing litigation puts integration at the
center of the theory of recovery—but school integration, not
housing integration. Here, residential segregation—the
result of interacting institutional rules and norms—connects
metropolitan equity with fair housing as the force that 
reproduces educational inequality. This relationship has
been clear to courts for a long time.251 The question is
251. The relationship between segregated housing patterns and segregated
schools is long recognized in school desegregation litigation. See, e.g., Bradley v.
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whether systemic FHA litigation can make it an explicit
grounds for remedy.
Although inter-district choice educational plans are too
complex for a thorough discussion here,252 we can narrow the
hypothetical to highlight the FHA issues. Take the
exceptional case of the “failing” urban school district that has
been taken over by the state, such as Newark or Camden, 
New Jersey. The principle of local control of key community
institutions has now passed to the state, often for five-year
terms (in Newark’s case for over fifteen years) until a
threshold for educational sufficiency is reached.253 Control
may be returned to the district when it has demonstrated
Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 940 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (“Where the actions of state
defendants and local school authorities throughout the metropolitan area have
had the natural, foreseeable, and actual effect of building upon, taking advantage
of, and encouraging racially segregated demographic patterns deliberately fixed
by governmental action at all levels with the effect of creating and maintaining
racial segregation in the public schools, there is a present obligation to eliminate
the continuing effects of such violation; and the District Court has the duty, upon
default by school authorities, to intervene to secure compliance with the
Constitution pursuant to the sound exercise of traditional equity powers
consistent with the practicalities of the local situation.”) (citing Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1, 15–16, 20–21, 31–32 (1971)).
252. For more in-depth discussion of the relevant issues, see AMY STUART
WELLS ET AL., CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON INST. FOR RACE & JUSTICE, BOUNDARY
CROSSING FOR DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND ACHIEVEMENT: INTER-DISTRICT SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 9 (2009). See also Neil Kraus,
Concentrated Poverty and Urban School Reform: “The Choice Is Yours” in
Minneapolis, EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 262 (2008); Anita Wadhwa, Crossing
the Line & Closing the Gap: Interdistrict Magnet Schools as Remedies for
Segregation, Concentrated Poverty and Inequality (Charles Hamilton Houston
Inst. for Race & Justice, Working Paper, 2009).
253. For an overview of school takeover policies, see INST. ON EDUC. L. & POL’Y,
50-STATE REPORT ON ACCOUNTABILITY, STATE INTERVENTION & TAKEOVER, 
http://ielp.rutgers.edu/docs/developing_plan_app_b.pdf (last visited Oct. 19,
2016). See also State Legislation: Accountability—Sanctions/Interventions— 
Takeovers, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, http://b5.caspio.com/dp.asp?
AppKey=b7f93000695b3d0d5abb4b68bd14&id=a0y70000000CblWAAS. The
practice may be on the rise, especially in Republican-led states. See Lindsey
Layton, GOP-led States Increasingly Taking Control from Local School Boards, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gop-
led-states-increasingly-taking-control-from-local-school-boards/2016/02/01/ 
c01a8e4e-bad3-11e5-b682-4bb4dd403c7d_story.html.
   
  
   
   
    
     
    
 
 
   
    
    
   
   
    
 
     
   
     
 
   
   
  
     
  
      
   
   
   
        
    
      
    
    
    
     
   
      
1052017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
that it can educate as other, better-performing districts do.
Both metropolitan equity researchers and education
professionals understand, however, that a primary reason
for the persistence of failed outcomes has been residential
segregation. Housing segregation was a primary factor in
creating low-performing, overwhelmingly minority schools in
the first place. Years later, housing segregation is a primary
explanation for the distance between performance outcomes 
between those schools and their more affluent,
overwhelmingly white and Asian schools in other parts of
their region. To add one other factual wrinkle to the hypo, 
the state already has an inter-district choice statute in place.
However, it is only voluntary and seldom used. The strongest 
districts, even several near the one under state control, have
declined to participate.
The legal issue is as follows: denied the choice to attend
schools outside their home districts despite a condition of
officially recognized failing schools, could parents from the 
urban school district use 3604(b) to sue the state department 
of education for denying their children the educational
opportunities—i.e., “privileges”—ordinarily associated with
fair housing choice—i.e., “in the provision of [educational]
services . . . in connection therewith”—because of their race, 
national origin, and familial status?
This lawsuit would set up a monumental clash of localist
principles—the right of residentially excluded children to
educational choice versus the right of municipal school
districts to control attendance—combined with the interest
in providing for all children. As a statutory matter, the
plaintiff families would have to prove not only which relevant
(and timely) state policies caused the segregation. More
importantly, they would have to prove that denial of
educational opportunity is a foreseeable result of
segregation. In other words, they would have to prove that
housing policy really is education policy for purposes of the
Act. Is school attendance a “privilege” of the sale or rental of
a dwelling? It depends on what privilege means and whether
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it can be equated with opportunity or simple access to 
whatever school is available. Is education a “service”
normally associated with housing choice? Common sense and
innumerable studies of property values would suggest so.
E.  Fraud and Other Systemic Litigation 
Although the Act’s AFFH requirement does not provide
a private right of action, governments have been sued for
fraudulently certifying that they have met the requirements
in return for federal funding.254 The most notable case thus
far is United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Center of
Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester County255 in which a qui
tam relator (whistleblower) brought suit against the county
under the federal False Claims Act.256 The district court
found that Westchester had indeed falsified certification
reports by, among other things, producing the required
Analyses of Impediments without taking race into account or
254. In United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. Metro N.Y., Inc. v.
Westchester Cty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), the court noted:
The distinction between AFFH actions and affordable housing activities
is further explained in the HUD Guide:
The two concepts are not equivalent but they are also not entirely
separate. When a jurisdiction undertakes to build or rehabilitate
housing for low- and moderate-income families, for example, this
action is not in and of itself sufficient to affirmatively further fair
housing. It may be providing an extremely useful service by
increasing the supply of decent, safe, and sanitary affordable
housing. Providing adequate housing and improving existing
neighborhoods are vital functions and should always be encouraged.
Additionally, the provision of affordable housing is often important
to minority families and to persons with disabilities because they
are disproportionately represented among those that would benefit
from low-cost housing. When steps are taken to assure that the
housing is fully available to all residents of the community,
regardless of race, color, national origin, gender, handicap, or
familial status, those are the actions that affirmatively further fair
housing.
255. Id.
256. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2016).
   
   
    
    
    
    
 
   
 
   
    
    
     
  
  
    
 
    
 
     
     
 
    
  
   
  
  
      
  
       
      
    
 
     
     
      
1072017] INCLUSION IMAGINED
without certifying steps it would take to ameliorate racial
segregation.257 At its core, the Westchester case may be the
closest thing to a private right of action under AFFH without
suing HUD. Seen in the most generous light, Westchester
County was found to conflate affordable housing with fair
housing.258 
Westchester is probably not alone in this conflation,
which constitutes a violation of Title VIII’s express interests
in desegregation and racial equality. The kind of continued
racial segregation in Westchester that can be viewed on a
map is repeated across metropolitan America, including New
Jersey. In fact, New Jersey’s racial segregation continues in
spite of a state fair housing law that codifies Westchester’s 
conflation of affordable with fair housing.259 Many 
governmental recipients of HUD funding could be vulnerable
to suits such as Westchester. In states like New Jersey that
have codified non-racial “fair share” housing while
reproducing segregation, the state agencies responsible for
enforcing fair housing might be sued for failing to administer
their fair housing laws in a manner that affirmatively
furthers the federal definition of fair housing.
CONCLUSION 
The policy of fair housing expressed in the FHA
combined the ideals of anti-discrimination and anti-
segregation in order to advance an interest in access to equal
opportunities that is as relevant today as it was during its
violent origins. The empirical parallels between structural
inequality now and structural inequality in 1968 are not
surprising. Recall that the character of African American 
disadvantage addressed by Martin Luther King and Malcolm
X and described in Part II was institutionally pervasive.
Slum conditions in housing itself as well as systemic
257. Westchester, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
258. Id. at 555.
259. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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restrictions on affordable options, private discrimination,
and inflated costs were paramount. But they were
accompanied by a landscape of underfinanced and under-
resourced schools, declining infrastructure, inadequate
transportation options, prohibitive insurance rates, 
employment barriers, and often shockingly hostile relations
with law enforcement and the criminal justice system. That
complex array of crushing deficits continued to occur in the
decades that followed. The segregation of people and
resources led to a spectrum of inequality bracketed by
concentrations of great poverty and great wealth. If nothing
else, what the theory of structural, or place-based, inequality
demonstrates is the exacting plasticity of an endemic and
efficient stratification.
This Article articulated the theoretical and practical
bridge between evolving notions of fair housing and the
empirically drawn realities of metropolitan equity study and
advocacy. The two are joined by a theory of structural
inequality, which posits that inequality of opportunity is
sustained by place-based disparities in the rules and
resources that govern the same key institutions differently,
often by race and socioeconomic status. Places, therefore, 
have opportunity identities that are radically distinct.
Housing and housing-related policies represent the key
institution—then and now—that sustain these differences.
Despite almost fifty years of relative failure, it takes only an
expansion of the FHA’s scope to imagine equitable solutions
for the realization of meaningful inclusion across our
metropolitan landscapes.
